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EUROPEAN SATELLITE EARTH
OBSERVATION: LAW, REGULATIONS,
POLICIES, PROJECTS,
AND PROGRAMMES
FRANs G. VON DER DUNKt
I. INTRODUCTION
Outer space is no longer the exclusive domain of the two Cold War
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, many
states now understand the potential benefits that outer space activi-
ties can bring and have become active in outer space activities in their
own ways. Amongst the major players in outer space, specifically the
area of satellite earth observation, one area stands out: Europe. Eu-
rope is not a single state, such as the United States, Russia, Japan,
China, India, or Brazil; rather, Europe is comprised of a number of
sovereign member states. The term Europe as used in the previous
sentence usually refers to some institutional version of Europe, not to
the geographically defined continent.' Europe as an institution, more-
over, is not even the complete picture because there are several ver-
sions of Europe which are of importance when it comes to space
activities generally or to the more specific sector of satellite earth ob-
servation and downstream distribution of data resulting from satellite
earth observation.
Vice versa, satellite earth observation is also a major issue for Eu-
rope whether it concerns the use of satellites for ecological and climate
monitoring purposes, for commercial or other economic purposes, or
even for security-oriented applications. Indeed, as will be seen, a
number of laws and regulations addressing satellite earth observation
have been drafted in Europe during the last few decades as a conse-
quence of certain policies or policy approaches. Additionally, these
policies or policy approaches then affect new policies or new policy ap-
proaches. In particular, the aforementioned policies or policy ap-
proaches make certain options less interesting, less feasible, or even
plainly illegal. Furthermore, as will be addressed infra in this Article,
within such policies and legal regimes, actual space projects and
programmes are developed, agreed upon, financed, and executed.
t University of Nebraska-Lincoln, College of Law.
1. Europe, geographically defined, runs from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural
mountain range, and from the Arctic Ocean to the Caucasus mountain range.
von der Dunk in Creighton Law Review (2008-2009) 42. 
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This Article represents an effort to analyse, or at least map, some
of the consequences of the rather complicated European spacescape on
the development of law, regulations, and policies in the area of satel-
lite earth observation. Further, this Article will examine some dis-
tinct results of laws, regulations, and policies which are concerned
with satellite earth observation. Specifically, this Article will examine
satellite earth observation-related projects and programmes that try
to project some European presence in outer space. One of those
projects and programmes is the Global Monitoring for Environmental
Security project which has recently been renamed Kopernikus;
Kopernikus serves in several respects as the standard bearer for Euro-
pean involvement in satellite earth observation in the service of vari-
ous terrestrial applications for the years to come.
From the perspective of earth observation by means of satellites,
observers may discern no less than three Europes in space that are of
major importance: the European Space Agency ("ESA"), the European
Meteorological Satellite Organisation ("EUMETSAT"), and the Euro-
pean Union ("EU")/European Community ("EC"). The ESA, EUMET-
SAT, and EU/EC each play roles, sometimes in cooperation with each
other, in shaping the laws and policies, and in developing and execut-
ing the projects and programmes, that try to maximize the benefits
that satellite earth observation can bring to Europe. However, as this
Article shall establish, analysis should not neglect the individual
member states of the ESA, EUMETSAT, and EU/EC or the important
fact that the memberships of these three organisations are far from
identical.
II. THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY
The European Space Agency ("ESA"), the first of the Europes to be
analysed, was established as a successor to two earlier European ef-
forts to cooperate in space matters, the European Launcher Develop-
ment Organisation ("ELDO")2 and the European Space Research
Organization ("ESRO").3 Furthermore, ESA is based upon a conven-
tion that was drafted in 1975 and entered into force in 1980.4 ESA is
headquartered in Paris, France. Additionally, ESA has major estab-
2. Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Develop-
ment and Construction of Space Vehicle Launchers, Mar. 29, 1962, 507 U.N.T.S. 177
(entered into force Feb. 29, 1964); KEVIN MADDERS, A NEW FORCE AT A NEW FRONTIER
43-55, 75-76, 114-16 (1997).
3. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Research Organization,
June 14, 1962, 158 U.N.T.S. 35; MADDERS, supra note 2, at 55-60, 66-75.
4. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, May 30, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 864 [hereinafter ESA Convention]; SPACE LAW - BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS
§ C.I.1. (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel & Marietta Benko eds., 2008); JOHN KRIGE, THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE ESA CONVENTION 13-18 (1994); MADDERS, supra note 2, at 179.
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lishments in the Netherlands (the European Space Research and
Technology Centre in Noordwijk ("ESTEC")), Germany (the European
Space Operations Centre in Darmstadt ("ESOC") and the European
Astronaut Centre in Cologne ("EAC')), and Italy (the ESA Centre for
Earth Observation ("ESRIN") that also acts as the information and
database center in Frascati near Rome). Currently, eighteen individ-
ual member states comprise ESA.5
ESA has two main organs dealing with relevant policy issues.
First, there is ESA's Council which consists of representatives from
ESA's individual member states (often at the Ministerial level) and
acts as the supreme body of ESA. The Council from this perspective
is, inter alia, to:
(d) adopt the annual work plans of the Agency;
(e) ...
(i) adopt the annual general budget of the Agency...;
(ii) adopt each programme budget... ;
(f) adopt.., the Financial Regulations and all other finan-
cial arrangements of the Agency; ...
(i) adopt the Staff Regulations ... ;
(j) adopt.., rules under which authorisation will be given,
bearing in mind the peaceful purposes of the Agency, for
the transfer outside the territories of the Member States
of technology and products developed under the activities
of the Agency or with its help;
(k) decide on the admission of new Member States in accor-
dance with Article XXII; . . . [and]
(m) take all other measures necessary for the fulfilment of
the purpose of the Agency within the framework of this
Convention. 6
In using such competencies, the Council also effectively deter-
mines the policies to be pursued by and in the context of ESA. Specifi-
cally, the Council decides on the high-level programmes and projects
that give substance and shape to any ESA policy.
The second main organ of ESA that deals with relevant policy is-
sues consists of the Director General together with other ESA staff.
ESA staff, in this respect, are charged with carrying out the Director
General's responsibilities and competencies as provided for by the
5. The list of member states comprises Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Of
these, it may already be noted, Norway and Switzerland are not members of the Euro-
pean Union. In addition, non-European Canada is a long-standing cooperating partner
under a special agreement, whereas Hungary, Romania and Poland qualify as Euro-
pean Cooperating States under another special agreement.
6. ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. XI(5); MADDERS, supra note 2, at 195.
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Convention. The ESA Convention sets forth the main tasks of the Di-
rector General as follows:
(b) The Director General shall be the chief executive officer of
the Agency and its legal representative. He shall take all
measures necessary for the management of the Agency, the
execution of its programmes, the implementation of its policy
and the fulfilment of its purpose, in accordance with the di-
rectives issued by the Council. He shall have authority over
the establishments of the Agency. He shall, in regard to the
financial administration of the Agency, act in accordance
with the provisions of Annex II. He shall make an annual re-
port to the Council, and this report shall be published. He
may also submit proposals concerning activities and
programmes as well as measures designed to ensure the ful-
filment of the Agency's purpose. He attends meetings of the
Agency without the right to vote. 7
The actual impact the Director General may have on the formula-
tion of ESA policies depends upon a number of interlocking factors
essentially of a non-legal nature and may, consequently, vary consid-
erably. However, at the end of the day, the Director General's actions
are always subject to confirmation and a form of high-level control by
the Council as enshrined in the ESA Convention.
A final key point to be noted when trying to understand the
proper role of ESA in shaping European policies and regulations in the
realm of satellite earth observation concerns the way in which the
ESA space programmes are developed and run. While both ESA's in-
dividual member states, through the Council, and the Director Gen-
eral, as assisted by his or her staff, can propose that ESA engage in
certain space programmes, such programmes generally need to be one
of three kinds.
The first kind of programme that can be proposed to ESA's Coun-
cil are the so-called mandatory activities. Mandatory activities are
those programmes that every ESA member state is obliged to partici-
pate in. These programmes concern ". . . the execution of basic activi-
ties, such as education, documentation, studies of future work projects
and technological research work; .. .[and] the elaboration and execu-
tion of a scientific programme including satellites and other space sys-
tems" to the extent follow-up activities on the ground are concerned.
ESA should also "collect relevant information and disseminate it to
Member States, draw attention to gaps and duplication, and provide
advice and assistance for the harmonisation of international and na-
7. ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. XII(1); MADDERS, supra note 2, at 203-05.
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tional programmes."8 Regarding financing the mandatory activities,
which are essentially scientific, non-space activities, all ESA member
states must finance the mandatory activities, once properly agreed
upon, through a pre-determined scale of respective contributions. 9
Secondly, ESA may agree to conduct optional activities. Optional
activities concern, in particular, space programmes as opposed to
programmes concerned with the preparation for the space program-
mes or programmes concerned with after-mission space programme
issues. The ESA Convention in this regard refers to "the design, de-
velopment, construction, launching, placing in orbit, and control of
satellites and other space systems; [and] the design, development, con-
struction, and operation of launch facilities and space transport sys-
tems."10 In percentage terms, ESA's optional activities have made up
eighty to eighty-five percent of ESA's activities, as opposed to fifteen
to twenty percent of those being mandatory in nature.1 1
The optional character of these activities manifests itself by way
of an opt-out clause as the ESA Convention provides that "all Member
States participate apart from those that formally declare themselves
not interested in participating therein."1 2 Optional ESA activities are
also financed in a different manner than are mandatory ESA activi-
ties. Specifically, the financial contribution formula, as applied to
ESA's optional activities, is an opt-out from the standard rule that in-
dividual member states contribute financing as a proportion of each
individual member state's national income averaged over the most re-
cent three years.1 3 Here, individual member state contributions are
decided, as it were, from the ground up. That is, each individual mem-
ber state promises, as following from its own particular measure of
interest in such optional activities, to contribute a certain percentage
to the proposed programme budget for the activity in question. Once
the proposed programme reaches a certain threshold in terms of prom-
ised financing, for example eighty-five percent of the agreed total
budget, it is formally accepted as an ESA optional activity.
8. ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. V(1.a), sub. (i)-(iii); MADDERS, supra note 2,
at 223-35.
9. ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. XIII(1). Essentially, a particular member
state's contribution to a mandatory programme is determined relative to the total
budget apportioned to that programme, in proportion as based upon the average na-
tional income of that member state over the three most recent years.
10. ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. V(1.b) (emphasis added); MADDERS, supra
note 2, at 189-95, 235.
11. MADDERS, supra note 2, at 189. The third category of ESA activities formally
speaking is not part of the ESA budget; see infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text,
12. ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. V(1).
13. See ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. XIII(2).
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Furthermore, it should be noted that the aforementioned corner-
stones of ESA's general - including in particular industrial - policy
are implemented by means of the so-called geographical distribution
approach in order to "ensure that all Member States participate in an
equitable manner, having regard to their financial contribution
.... "14 The result of the geographical distribution approach, further
elaborated in Annex V to the ESA Convention, is often labelled fair
return, industrial return or juste retour. Under fair return, each indi-
vidual member state should roughly receive its own investment in a
particular programme returned to the individual member state in the
form of orders for its space industry, preferably for the very pro-
gramme at issue or alternatively as compensation derived from orders
for other programmes. 15
Over the past several decades, ESA's success has shown that the
dichotomy between mandatory and optional activities is remarkably
pragmatic. Specifically, it has demonstrated that this was a workable
compromise to balance an individual member state's need to maintain
their sovereign independence in choosing to contribute to, and partici-
pate in, actual space programmes (on an d la carte-basis as it were)
and their need for some coherence in ESA's programmes. Such a bal-
ance is needed in order for ESA to provide any added value to individ-
ual member states in terms of real cooperation and an efficient pooling
of resources between them.
The ESA Convention also mentions a third category of activities:
operational activities. 16 Operational activities are undertaken upon
the specific request of a third party rather than being conjured up by
ESA itself. As a consequence, such operational activities are not fi-
nanced by the budget of ESA; rather they are paid for in principle on a
14. ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. VII(1.c).
15. ESA Convention, supra note 4, arts. II, IV, Annex V; MADDERS, supra note 2, at
384-88. While the ideal "overall return coefficient" (art. PV(3)) is 1, meaning every euro
contributed by a member state should be matched exactly by a euro's worth of contract
value for a company from that Member State under a contract by the Agency, there are
a number of complicated arrangements in place to allow for considerable flexibility.
Moreover, due to pressure from the European Union in recent years (which views this
system with some suspicion, as it may easily have anti-competitive effects), the general
application of the concept has become more relaxed still.
16. ESA Convention, supra note 4, art. V(2).
[Vol. 42
EUROPEAN SATELLITE OBSERVATION
full-cost, not-for-profit, 17 basis by the individual member state, organ-
isation, or entity requesting such services.' 8
III. THE EUROPEAN METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE
ORGANISATION
The European Meteorological Satellite Organisation ("EUMET-
SAT"), the second Europe to be scrutinised in this Article, can be qual-
ified as a daughter entity of the European Space Agency ("ESA").19
ESA, under the ESA Convention, is tasked only to undertake activi-
ties "to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes,
cooperation among European States in space research and technology
and their space applications, with a view to their being used for scien-
tific purposes and for operational space applications systems."20 Al-
though this clause is generally interpreted quite broadly, such use and
operations themselves, in particular if on a more or less routine basis,
are not considered to be the proper domain of ESA. Consequently
when ESA has developed a satellite system ready for operational ac-
tivities, the ESA Council decided to establish separate entities for the
purpose of overseeing such operations after the satellite system was
developed. For example once the experimental European Communi-
cation Satellite had proven its operational capabilities, a new inter-
governmental organization, EUTELSAT, was created to operate and
expand the satellite system.
2 1
17. Such a monetary reimbursement could of course be partially or completely
waived to the extent ESA considers other interests to merit the provision of such service
without full reimbursement, and/or ESA considers itself de facto reimbursed by in-kind
compensation. For example in the context of the International Space Station ("ISS"), it
is common practice that the partners exchange services and goods as much as possible
on a closed-purse, no-exchange-of-funds basis. Agreement among the Government of
Canada, Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Govern-
ment of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the
United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Sta-
tion, art. 15(5), Jan. 29, 1998 (entered into force Mar. 27, 2001); SPACE LAw, supra note
4, § D.II.4.
18. In the past indeed ESA has provided such services for individual states, other
international organisations, such as EUMETSAT, and private companies such as
Arianespace.
19. KEVIN MADDERS, A NEW FORCE AT A NEW FRONTIER 516-20 (1997).
20. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, art. II, May 30,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 864 [hereinafter ESA Convention] (emphasis added).
21. MADDERS, supra note 19, at 504; Convention Establishing the European Tele-
communications Satellite Organization, cmnd. 9069, July 15, 1982 [hereinafter EUTEL-
SAT Convention]; SPACE LAW - BASIC LEGAL DocuMENTs §§ C.II.1, C.II.2 (Karl-Heinz
Bockstiegrl & Marietta Benko eds., 2008); Operating Agreement Relating to the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), cmnd. 9154, July 15,
1982. In the late 1990s, when satellite communications evolved from a public-service
operation to a commercial, competitive environment, the intergovernmental organisa-
tion was privatised, the satellite system henceforth being run by the France-based pri-
vate company, Eutelsat.
2009]
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In a similar manner, ESA developed and launched an experimen-
tal European weather-monitoring satellite named Meteosat-1 in late
1977. Because Meteosat-1 did not fail until completing two years of
successful orbital operations, the satellite proved the viability of the
technical and operational concepts underlying it as well as the bene-
fits that could be derived from such meteorological monitoring. At the
same time, Meteosat-1 established that similar operations need to be
conducted on a more permanent basis by an organisation specifically
dedicated to meteorological monitoring.
Therefore, the European States concerned drafted a Convention
in 1983, which entered into force in 1986, to establish EUMETSAT.2 2
EUMETSAT is headquartered in Darmstadt, Germany. Specifically,
EUMETSAT's headquarters are situated next door to ESA's Space Op-
erations Centre ("ESOC"), testifying to the continuing close coopera-
tion of ESA with its new daughter entity EUMETSAT.
At the same time, the formally independent character of EUMET-
SAT also resulted in the organisation now having several more indi-
vidual member states as compared to ESA. To be precise,
EUMETSAT has twenty-two individual member states as members
including one European state member who is neither a member of
ESA nor of the European Union (Croatia), two further European non-
European Union members (Norway and Switzerland), and even a
state normally not considered European altogether (Turkey).2 3
Since its inception, EUMETSAT's main purpose is to serve the
national meteorological services of its members and - at a secondary
level - other entities active in the field of weather monitoring and
forecast. Particularly, EUMETSAT's aim was:
to establish, maintain and exploit European systems of oper-
ational meteorological satellites [currently numbering six],
taking into account as far as possible the recommendations of
the World Meteorological Organization .... A further objec-
tive of EUMETSAT is to contribute to the operational moni-
toring of the climate and the detection of global climatic
changes.24
22. Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploita-
tion of Meteorological Satellite, cmnd. 9483, May 24, 1983 (amended July 14, 1994)
[hereinafter EUMETSAT Convention]; SPACE LAW, supra note 21, § C.III.1; John Mor-
gan, EUMETSAT - The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellites, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ESA CONVENTION 167-73 (1994).
23. The full list of member states comprises Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and
the United Kingdom. In addition, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Iceland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania are Cooperating States.
24. EUMETSAT Convention, supra note 22, art. 2(1). The references to operational
monitoring of the climate and detection of global climatic changes followed from the
[Vol. 42
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More generally, EUMETSAT should continue the Meteosat pro-
gramme and develop, as relevant, new programmes in the field.25
As indicated, ESA continues to provide particular support to
EUMETSAT's activities in the area of telemetry, tracking, and control
through the European Space Operations Centre ("ESOC"). 26 Addi-
tionally, ESA provides support for EUMETSAT's activities in the form
of research and development in new generation meteorological and en-
vironmental satellites - which are operational activities for ESA.27
However, EUMETSAT remains responsible for satellites after the
satellites are developed and function as an operational prototype. Ad-
ditionally, EUMETSAT remains responsible for the development of
the attendant ground infrastructure needed to operate the satellites.
The Council of EUMETSAT, comprised of representatives from its
member states, is the governing organ of the organisation. The Coun-
cil decides key issues such as the accession of new member states to
EUMETSAT and issues relating to the development, launch, and op-
eration of new satellites and systems. Additionally, the Council of
EUMETSAT decides on an annual budget and other main financial
parameters related to the organisation's activities. In other words,
the Council of EUMETSAT is the key policy-setting/overseeing body of
EUMETSAT. 28
Next in line to the Council of EUMETSAT, a EUMETSAT Secre-
tariat,29 headed by a director, is responsible for the implementation
and execution of the programmes and the day-to-day running of the
organisation in addition to his or her responsibilities as the legal rep-
resentative of EUMETSAT.30
With a view to the financing and procurement policies that are
key to ESA's structure as discussed previously, it is interesting to
compare ESA's financing and procurement policies with those of
EUMETSAT. Generally speaking, the:
expenditure[s] of EUMETSAT shall be covered by the finan-
cial contributions of the Member States and by any other
EUMETSAT income, [which contributions shall be based] on
the basis of the average Gross National Product (GNP) of
2000 amendment of the EUMETSAT Convention. W. Balogh & P. Valabrega, EUMET-
SAT International Cooperation Activities, in CORINNE M. CONTANT JORGENSEN, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 189 (2007).
25. EUMETSAT Convention, supra note 22, preamble.
26. ESA Convention, supra note 20, art. V(2); Balogh & Valabrega, supra note 24,
at 191.
27. ESA Convention, supra note 20, art. V(2); Balogh & Valabrega, supra note 24,
at 191.
28. EUMETSAT Convention, supra note 22, arts. 4, 5.
29. Id. art. 7.
30. Id. art. 6.
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each Member State for the three latest years for which statis-
tics are available.3 1
Thus, EUMETSAT's financing policies are roughly equivalent to those
of ESA, even if the formula is slightly different.
In terms of the procurement policy, however, the cornerstone is
open competition with fixed price contracts. Whilst taking into ac-
count European expertise, the contract will be awarded on a best-
value-for-money basis, as based upon price and running costs, quality
and schedule, as well as performance and guarantees. In other words,
there is no guarantee for member states to see their contributions
somehow returned to their industries as would have been the case
under geographical distribution or fair return.32
Finally, since the EUMETSAT Convention was amended in 2000,
EUMETSAT recognizes optional activities, essentially on an opt-in (as
opposed to ESA's opt-out) basis.3 3 Regarding optional activities, the
EUMETSAT Convention itself explicitly provides that: "[o]ptional
programmes take effect once at least one third of all EUMETSAT
Member States have declared their participation by signing the Decla-
ration within the time frame set out and the subscriptions of these
Participating States have reached ninety percent of the total financial
envelope." 34 Logically, the financing of EUMETSAT's optional
programmes follows the d la carte-approach. 3 5
IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION
The involvement of the European Union, as the successor at a po-
litical if not completely at the legal level of the European Community,
stems from a completely different background than do the involve-
ments of the European Space Agency ("ESA") and the European Mete-
orological Satellite Organisation ("EUMETSAT") as discussed above.
Therefore, it is appropriate to clarify the background of the European
Community and European Union's involvement in outer space activi-
ties because they represent a unique feature in the field of space activ-
ities and satellite earth observation in more ways than one. Thus, the
European Community and the European Union represent the third
Europe to be discussed in this Article.
31. Id. art. 10(1), resp. (2).
32. Id. art. 2(3).
33. Id. art. 2(6). As indicated, however, in practice the difference between the re-
spective ESA and EUMETSAT approaches is not that large. ESA's formal opt-out basis
effectively results in an opt-in approach through the financing process. Id.
34. Id. art. 3(2).
35. Id. arts. 5(3.b), 10(5).
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In stark contrast with ESA and EUMETSAT, the European Com-
munity, and later the European Union, became involved in the Euro-
pean spacescape primarily as a regulator and has only recently become
active in a more operational context. However, that role very much
remains a secondary one. In particular, the European Community ef-
fectively pools together the regulatory efforts of the still-sovereign
Member States while establishing its own distinct legal order, a sui
generis-construction, which may be referred to as a supranational
half-way house between an international organization and a federa-
tion-like structure.
At present, twenty-seven European states3 6 have subjected them-
selves to the framework of the European Community where each indi-
vidual member state has a very extensive set of rights and owes a very
extensive set of obligations toward each other individual member
states. The framework of the European Community was achieved
through each individual member state's ratification of the European
Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") Treaty,3 7 the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Atomic Energy Community ("EAEC") or Euratom
Treaty,38 and the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Com-
munity ("EEC")39 in the 1950s. Such treaties included, in addition to
the various accession treaties allowing for new member states to join
the European Community, the Single European Act of 1986,40 the
Treaty on European Union of 1992,41 the Treaty of Amsterdam of
1997,42 and the Treaty of Nice of 2001. 4 3
Of the aforementioned treaties, the Treaty on European Union of
1992 is the most important. It effectively extended the scope of Euro-
36. The list of member states comprises Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
37. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
126 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ESCS Treaty].
38. Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EAEC Treaty].
39. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
40. Single European Act, Feb. 28, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 506, O.J. 169/1 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Single European Act]. One major result of the Single European Act was the integra-
tion of the main institutions of the three communities concerned, in particular the
European Commission and the Council of Ministers.
41. Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, O.J. 191/1
(1992).
42. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J.
340/73 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
43. Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. 80/81
[hereinafter Treaty of Nice].
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pean integration as it had arisen on the basis of the three treaties of
the 1950s while re-christening the EEC Treaty as the European Com-
munity ("EC") Treaty.4 4 Also, the Treaty on European Union provided
two more pillars to base the European Union upon in addition to the
single pillar encompassing the EC Treaty, ECSC Treaty, and the
EAEC Treaty. 45 However, these two additional pillars remained
purely intergovernmental and almost completely outside the estab-
lished legal structure of the European Community with its many su-
pranational features. For that reason, reference should still be made
to the European Community, rather than to the European Union, as
long as the reference concerns the legal framework based on the EC
Treaty.
Though ultimately still based on a number of treaties between
sovereign states, a distinct and partly supranational legal order has
now emerged. In many instances, the European Community can now,
by law, override the interests, policies, and legislation of individual
member states. Together, the aforementioned treaties form a body of
primary European Community law, inter alia, creating the main Eu-
ropean Community organs, to wit the Council of Ministers,4 6 the Eu-
ropean Commission, 47 the European Parliament, 48 and the European
Court of Justice.4 9 The treaties also provided these organs with ex-
tensive legal competences. The main European Community organ
then used, and continues to use, the legal competences to jointly ex-
tend the scope of European Community law in that the organs draft
and enunciate what is commonly called secondary EC law.
Secondary European Community law is basically composed of
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions.50 Regulations are essentially
laws on a European level; they are phrased in general terms and apply
comprehensively, at least as far as indicated or expressly provided for
by the Regulations themselves. Additionally, Directives are also laws
44. Following a major renumbering exercise through the Treaty of Amsterdam and
some further amendments by means of the Treaty of Nice, the present version of the EC
Treaty, as part of the Treaty on European Union, dates from 2002. Treaty Establishing
the European Community (Consolidated Version), O.J. 325/33 (2002) [hereinafter EC
Treaty].
45. The first pillar was now that of the European Community, based not only on
the EC Treaty (Title II, Treaty on European Union), but also on the ECSC Treaty and
EAEC Treaty (Titles III, resp. IV, Treaty on European Union). Currently, these addi-
tional two "pillars" are labeled Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP") and Po-
lice and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters ("PJCCM"). Treaty on European
Union, tit. V, resp. VI.
46. EC Treaty, supra note 44, arts. 202-10.
47. Id. arts. 211-19.
48. Id. arts. 189-201.
49. Id. arts. 220-45.
50. Id. art. 249.
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in that they require individual member states to reach a required end
result. However, each individual member state is free to reach a Di-
rective's end result in a manner it sees fit so long as the end result is
reached prior to the Directive's deadline. Finally, Decisions also pro-
vide binding law, but only upon those entities to which they are explic-
itly or implicitly directed. In each case, Decisions override an
individual member state's national law or regulation if the latter is
contrary to the Decision.
The European Community's legal order presents the European
Community with its own measure of jurisdiction over a wide range of
economic or economy-related activities. Moreover, the European Com-
munity's jurisdiction can be directly applied to individual member
states and to private persons and entities who are under the domestic
jurisdictions of the individual member states of the European Commu-
nity. In addition, private persons and entities who are under the do-
mestic jurisdictions of the individual member states of the European
Community can directly claim the rights and obligations that are im-
posed upon them by the European Community. Thus, those concerned
can call upon the European Court of Justice in a number of instances
to judge upon the legality of the European Community's actions, as
well as national actions. The existence of the European Court of Jus-
tice as the centre of the European Community's legal order represents
an essential measure of supranational adjudication.
On economic issues, the power of an individual member state to
legislate has largely been transferred to - or at least circumscribed at
- the European Community level. Essentially, the European Commu-
nity's organs have partially taken over the law-creating role of the in-
dividual member states. To that extent, a distinct and partly
supranational jurisdiction of the European Community has replaced
the individual jurisdiction of the individual member states.
As a consequence, the European Community (and later also the
European Union), once again in contrast to ESA and EUMETSAT, is
involved with all the economic activities of the individual member
states in the widest sense of the word. Space activities only constitute
one of the economic areas the European Community is currently con-
cerned with. However, only recently have space activities achieved
some prominent status with the European Community as exemplified
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with European Community projects such as Galileo51 and GMES/
Kopernikus. 5 2
Limitations to the European Community's competence, vis-&-vis
outer space and space-related activities, such as those activities that
concern satellite earth observation, would largely arise on the level of
general substance. The European Community's limited competence in
space-related activities emanate from European Community law as
interpreted in accordance with the notion of subsidiarity.53 If doubt
arises whether an issue could be regulated more effectively and logi-
cally at the European level or at individual member state's national
level, the presumption under subsidiarity is that the national level
should prevail.
As a result, unless the European Community's organs have un-
equivocally (even if only implicitly) been provided with the competence
to legislate on a certain issue, the power to legislate on such an issue
should be deemed to rest with the particular individual member state
and its national governmental authorities. In other words, the Euro-
pean Community's organs can legislate with respect to earth observa-
tion-related activities only to the extent that those activities are
clearly covered by provisions in primary or secondary European Com-
munity law. This applies, broadly speaking, to all economic activities
proper (that is without overriding public interests, such as those relat-
ing to military, social, or cultural issues, behind those activities).
Therefore, satellite earth observation-related activities fall within the
European Community legal order only to the extent that these activi-
ties may be considered to constitute a category of economic activities
proper.
In a substantive sense, the central and most comprehensive aim
of the European Community's integration efforts remains the creation
and maintenance of a common market.5 4 Effectively, only the internal
51. Galileo is the second-generation, European-owned and -operated global satel-
lite navigation system currently developed to be operational by 2013. Council Resolu-
tion on the European Contribution to the Development of a Global Navigation Satellite
System ("GNSS"), Dec. 19, 1994, O.J. 379/2; Council Regulation Setting Up the Galileo
Joint Undertaking, May 21, 2002, No. 876/2002, O.J. 138/1; Council Regulation on the
Establishment of Structures for the Management of the European Satellite Radio-Navi-
gation Programmes, July 12, 2004, No. 1321/2004, O.J. 246/1; Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the Further Implementation of the European
Satellite Navigation Programmes (EGNOS and Galileo), July 9, 2008, No. 683/2008/EC,
O.J. 196/1.
52. See Irmgard Marboe, National Space Legislation: The European Perspective, in
NATIONALES WELTRAUMRECHT - NATIONAL SPACE LAW 31-46 (2008) (accounting EU in-
volvement in European space activities); KEviN MADDERS, A NEW FORCE AT A NEW
FRONTIER 566-84 (1997). See infra notes 163-173 and accompanying text.
53. EC Treaty, supra note 44, art. 5.
54. Id. arts. 2, 3.
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market, being one side of the common market, was established as of
1993. 55 The internal market regime is based upon four freedoms (the
freedoms of movement of goods, persons, services, and capital), 56 an
anti-trust regime combating anti-competitive behaviour of govern-
ments (read: state aid) and companies (read: collusive conduct and
abuses of dominant positions) alike, 5 7 and harmonisation of relevant
national legislation.5 8
Turning now to the specific issue of satellite earth observation
and the way policies take shape within the European Community/Eu-
ropean Union, the European Community organs (in particular the Eu-
ropean Commission, as the European Community body acting most
directly in the common European interest) have obtained considerable
freedom to draft, or at least prepare, European policies through vary-
ing non-binding instruments such as resolutions, White Papers, and
Green Papers. 59 Yet, the boundaries of the freedom afforded to the
European Community's organs to draft European policies are always
provided by the body of European Community law and the political
will of the totality of European Union member states. With regard to
the political will of the totality of the European Union's member
states, they use their prerogatives (in particular through the Council)
to: (i) allow the European Community's organs to engage in any policy
initiatives; (ii) condition or control the European Community's organs'
policy initiatives; or (iii) obstruct the European Community's organs'
policy initiatives. Additionally, once a policy initiative has to be trans-
lated into new European Community law, the Council of Ministers in
its interplay with the European Commission, the European Parlia-
ment, and the European Court of Justice will be able to exercise some
degree of control over the European Community's organs' policy
initiatives. 60
55. Single European Act, supra note 40, arts. 13-19.
56. EC Treaty, supra note 44, arts. 23-31, 39-69.
57. Id. arts. 81-89.
58. Id. arts. 94, 95.
59. The earliest such document relevant for space activities was Toward's Europe-
wide systems and services - a Green Paper on a common approach in the field of satel-
lite communications in the European Community. Kevin Madders & Walter Thiebaut,
Carpe Diem: Europe Must Make a Genuine Space Policy Now, 23 SPACE POL'Y 7-12
(2007); Nicolas Peter, The EU's Emergent Space Diplomacy, 23 SPACE POL'Y 97-107
(2007); Gunter Verheugen, Europe's Space Plans and Opportunities for Cooperation, 21
SPACE POL'Y 93-95 (2005); Thomas Reuter, The Framework Agreement between the Eu-
ropean Space Agency and the European Community: A Significant Step Forward?, 53
ZEITSCHRIFT FMR LuFr- UND WELTRAUMRECHT 56-65 (2004).
60. See, e.g., EC Treaty, supra note 44, arts. 250-52 (providing the basis for the
complicated decision-making processes formally applicable to the development of Euro-
pean Community law).
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V. EARTH OBSERVATION POLICIES IN EUROPE - THE
EXAMPLE OF FRANCE
This Article previously established that when it comes to the de-
velopment, drafting, and execution of regulations and policies perti-
nent to satellite earth observation, there is no single Europe or
European entity which is in the driver's seat. Major parts of policy
and law-making in the area of satellite earth observation remain at an
individual member state's national level. In spite of the major ad-
vances in international integration achieved over the last decades in
Europe with regard to European space activities, the individual mem-
ber states, who are also members of the relevant space-related or-
ganisations, remain sovereign in the determination of their own
nation's policies, laws, and regulations if not otherwise agreed to in
the context of the European Space Agency ("ESA"), the European Me-
teorological Satellite Organisation ("EUMETSAT"), or conflicting and
applicable European Community law. In other words, these states de-
termine first and foremost their own policies, policy directions, and
approaches, and may also determine whether such a policy or policy
direction is better served by implementing it on a domestic level, in-
cluding enunciating legislation, using any of the various international
platforms available, or probably both.
When it comes to ESA and EUMETSAT platforms, involving ei-
ther platform would largely amount to the development and elabora-
tion of policies by means of specific projects. In contrast, when the
European Community platform is involved, it would predominantly
include working towards international regulation as international
regulation is still the main thrust of the European Community's
existence.
It is then only at a second level that the existence of these plat-
forms, due to the specific expertise developed in their context, may
lead to some input in the policy and law-making processes, essentially
autonomous, or at least separate from the sum of inputs, of the indi-
vidual member states. Particularly in ESA, the independent compe-
tence of the Director General has resulted in the proposition of many
mandatory or optional activities. 6 1 In the European Union context, it
is the mandate of the European Commission to execute policies, and to
often initiate policies, and to initiate specific European Community
legislation to further such policies which takes care of such input sep-
arate from that of the sovereign member states. In both cases, the
caretakers of the common interests of the member states ultimately
61. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency, art. XII(1)(b),
May 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 864 [hereinafter ESA Convention].
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still depend upon individual member states to the extent that any sep-
arate input can effectively result in space programmes (in the cases of
ESA and EUMETSAT), respectively new legislation (in the case of the
European Community).6 2
A good illustration of the working of these mechanisms in regard
to satellite earth observation programmes is represented by France,
the European state generally considered to be first amongst equals in
European space activities (excluding, obviously, the special case of
Russia). It must be noted that France was a leading factor in estab-
lishing ESA as a means to help establish a measure of independence
in outer space from the United States. It is not by accident that ESA's
headquarters are in Paris, France.63 Additionally, France was key in
establishing the first European Communities as a means, inter alia, to
preclude any possible belligerent resurgence of West-Germany and to
harness the latter's industrial potential for European and French
causes. 64 France remained the leading nation in the European Com-
munity until two things occurred. First, reunified Germany finally
shed its moral heritage from the Second World War. Second, the
United Kingdom had become a member of the European Community
after overcoming its relative outsider position due to its late entry.
Although France played a leading role in establishing both ESA
and the European Community, it always retained its right to decide
whether or not to involve any of those platforms in its policy objectives
as a sovereign state. France could, and did, propose space projects to
be undertaken as an ESA programme when France likely considered
it key to be able to make use of other states' financial, technical, and
political contributions. A good example is a programme initiated by
France to develop an independent European launcher, namely the Ari-
ane, that France proposed as an optional programme to ESA's
Council.
Once the Ariane programme had delivered a launcher prototype,
a specific entity, rather than ESA, was established to operate and of-
fer launch services on a commercial basis. 65 The entity created to op-
erate and offer launch services on a commercial basis was named
Arianespace.66
62. Cf id. art. 249-52 (providing the competences of the Commission from this
perspective).
63. KEVIN MADDERS, A NEW FORCE AT A NEW FRONTIER 22, 39-41, 114-117, 155
(1997).
64. RALPH A. FOLSoM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 2-5 (2005).
65. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
66. Statuts de la Societ6 Arianespace, Mar. 26, 1980 [hereinafter Arianespace
Statute].
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Arianespace is a consortium incorporated as a private firm under
French law6 7 and established at Evry, France. Therefore, Arianes-
pace is of French nationality. In addition, 58.48 percent of the owner-
ship shares of Arianespace belonged, at least under the original
arrangements, to French entities (the French space agency Centre Na-
tional d'itudes Spatiales ("CNES") was the largest single shareholder
and owned thirty-four percent of all Arianespace ownership shares).
Additionally, Arianespace itself is a Groupement d'Interet
Economique ("GIE") subsidiary to CNES. The remainder of Arianes-
pace's shares were divided over public and private entities in ten other
individual member states of ESA.68 Also, apart from its formal
characterisation as a GIE, Arianespace is still dependent upon ESA
and CNES.6 9 Arianespace builds, markets, and operates the Ariane
launchers, as developed largely by ESA and CNES, in addition to ex-
ploiting and maintaining the launching pads and related installations
at the Centre Spatial Guyanais ("CSG") at Kourou, in French
Guyana.70
However, France, by contrast, decided to work towards maximum
independence in the earth observation area. Specifically, France de-
veloped the Satellite Pour l'Observation de Terre ("SPOT") pro-
gramme and satellite system as an essentially national project with
only the minor participation of a few other European states on a bilat-
eral basis. Notably, France did not develop SPOT through ESA (or
EUMETSAT).7 1
In 1986, CNES launched the SPOT-1 satellite that undertook
earth observation by capturing pictures with twenty and ten meter-
resolutions for colour and black-and-white pictures respectively. The
SPOT-1 satellite earth observations were done essentially on France's
own behalf. The SPOT system involved, apart from the SPOT satel-
lites, two primary ground stations in Europe (at Toulouse, France and
Kiruna, Sweden) and an international network of twelve receiving sta-
tions that gradually expanded to twenty receiving stations. The other
67. Id. arts. 1, 3, 4, 6.
68. The figures concerning the shares held by entities outside France, grouped by
country, are as follows: Germany 19.6%; Belgium 4.4%; Italy 3.6%; United Kingdom
3.17%; Switzerland 2.7%; Spain 2.5%; Sweden 2.4%; Netherlands 2.2%; Denmark 0.7%;
and Ireland 0.25%.
69. Michel G. Bour~ly, Space Commercialization and the Law, 4 SPACE POL'Y 139
(1988).
70. Pamela L. MEREDITH & GEORGE S. ROBINSON, SPACE LAw: A CASE STUDY FOR
THE PRACTITIONER 307-08 (1992).
71. SPOT stands for Satellite Pour l'Observation de Terre [Satellite for Earth Ob-
servation]; Gerard Brachet, Earth Observation, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ESA
CONVENTION 175-76 (1994).
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states involved, whether European or not, were never taken on board
of the governance structure established for SPOT.
72
It was also a purely French policy decision to privatise the down-
stream marketing activities with regard to the data collected by the
SPOT programme. Thus, the private company SPOTImage was incor-
porated under French law in 1982, like Arianespace, as a GIE subsidi-
ary to CNES. SPOTImage was headquartered in Toulouse, France.
Additionally, SPOTImage's purpose was to market and sell the remote
sensing data collected by the SPOT satellites which, at that time, had
not been launched. 73 Shareholders in SPOTImage came from France,
Belgium, Italy, and Sweden. Notably, Belgium, Italy and Sweden were
the other states involved in financing the SPOT program.
7 4
Satellite earth observation was a matter intricately linked with
military and security issues. In terms of a data access policy, the
French government limited the precision of SPOT data that was to be
made available on the open market to a resolution of ten meters when
the first SPOT satellites had just been launched. However, the
French government's policy of limiting the precision of SPOT data
later changed when a similar United States policy was changed to al-
low for very high resolution data to be sold on the open market.
75
Similarly, France entered into some bilateral agreements with
several other states, European states in particular, on joint satellite
operations without using the option to involve ESA or EUMETSAT.
France's agreements even included a military satellite project, the He-
lios satellite, with Italy where the option of using ESA or EUMETSAT
would not even have been available. The reason that France could not
have used ESA for the Helios satellite programme is because ESA's
Convention requires it "to provide for and to promote, for exclusively
peaceful purposes, cooperation among European States in space re-
search and technology and their space applications."7 6 The phrase ex-
clusively peaceful purposes has been interpreted, at least until fairly
recently, to exclude any involvement with military operations. Whilst
EUMETSAT has no such reference in its Convention, the reason that
France could not have used that organisation as a platform for the
Helios satellite programme stems from the understanding that, as
72. Id. at 178.
73. MEREDITH & ROBINSON, supra note 70, at 26; BRACHET, supra note 70, at 176.
74. Kevin Madders, European Commercial Space: An Overview, 8 ECSL NEWS 1-2
(1991). CNES, as the largest single shareholder, holds 34.468%. See also MICHAEL HARR
& RAJIV KOHLI, COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION OF SPACE 39 (1990) (referring to the older
figure of CNES holding 39%; French entities altogether accounted for 87.8%, Sweden's
SSC held 6%, the Belgian government 4.4% and other entities the remaining shares).
75. Michel Bourbly, Legal Problems Posed by the Commercialization of Data Col-
lected by the European Remote Sensing Satellite ERS-1, 16 J. SPACE L. 130 (1988).
76. ESA Convention, supra note 61, art. II (emphasis added).
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such, meteorological data presumably cannot be used for anything
else but peaceful purposes. To the marginal extent that a counter-
vailing argument could be made, EUMETSAT's status as a daughter
entity of ESA would be expected to mean that the former would also
be subject to the latter's obligation to not be involved with military
operations.
In short, as the above analysis of the case of France establishes,
both ESA and EUMETSAT present possible channels for individual
member states' space policies to be taken to a higher level, even if
sometimes considerably changed in the process. Specifically, ESA and
EUMETSAT could possibly benefit individual member states' space
policies due to the contributions of other individual member states. As
this Article will further establish, a similar conclusion can be drawn in
the area of legislation and regulation with regard to the European
Community's legal framework to the extent, as far as the subject mat-
ter of this Article is concerned, that European Community law can
deal with satellite earth observation issues.
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON EARTH
OBSERVATION POLICIES
Before actually moving into the realm of policy making at an Eu-
ropean level on satellite earth observation, this Article's analysis will
next establish that such policy making is guided by one document of
international, even global, application: the United Nations General
Assembly containing the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the
Earth from Outer Space of 1986 ("Resolution 41/65"). 7 7 While a
United Nations General Assembly Resolution is not binding, the con-
tents and principles of Resolution 41/65 have been accepted with con-
sensus by most states operating earth observation systems as
evidenced by their policies and practices.78 Additionally, domestic
77. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 41/65, U.N. Doc. AIRES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Resolution 41/65]; United
Nations Treaty and Principles on Outer Space, TI 43, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/572/Rev.1, 25
I.L.M. 1334 (1986). It should be noted that the term remote sensing is often used inter-
changeably with earth observation, the latter term being used throughout the present
article.
78. Lesley J. Smith & Catherine Doldirina, Remote Sensing Data: Some Critical
Comments on the Current State of Regulation and Reflections on Reform, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 254-55 (2007);
Maureen Williams, The U.N. Principles on Remote Sensing Today, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FORTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 3 (2006); CARL Q. CHRIS-
TOL, SPACE LAw - Past, Present and Future 73 (1991); Vladamir Kopal, The Role of
United Nations Declarations of Principles in the Progressive Development of Space Law,
16 J. SPACE L. 14-20 (1988).
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laws have regularly deferred to Resolution 41/65.79 Thus, Resolution
41/65's principles are generally perceived to constitute customary in-
ternational law.8 0 At the same time, Resolution 41/65 was largely
drafted as broad legal principles rather than clear-cut rules, rights,
and/or obligations that could be directly implemented.
Therefore, it was in terms of (national as much as European) poli-
cies that Resolution 41/65 found its most widespread application.8 1
From such a perspective, the parts of Resolution 41/65 that deal with
downstream access to, and dissemination of, earth observation data
presented the most directly important principles. The key principle
here provides:
As soon as the primary data and the processed data concern-
ing the territory under its jurisdiction are produced, the
sensed State shall have access to them on a non-discrimina-
tory basis and on reasonable cost terms. The sensed State
shall also have access to the available analysed information
concerning the territory under its jurisdiction in the posses-
sion of any State participating in remote sensing activities on
the same basis and terms, taking particularly into account
the needs and interests of the developing countries.8 2
By way of explanation, the following may be added: the concept of
the sensed State and its opposite part refer to the dichotomy underly-
ing much of Resolution 41/65. This dichotomy was largely between
the developed states and the developing states which feared that other
states' remote sensing operations might encroach upon their perma-
nent sovereignty, particularly encroachment upon a developing state's
sovereignty over its natural resources.8 3 This sovereignty can become
almost meaningless if other states obtain superior-quality information
regarding the developing state's territory and the resources therein.
79. Smith & Doldirina, supra note 78, at 254-55; Williams, supra note 78, at 3;
CHRISTOL, supra note 78, at 73; Kopal, supra note 78, at 14-20.
80. Smith & Doldirina, supra note 78, at 254-55; Williams, supra note 78, at 3;
CHRISTOL, supra note 78, at 73; Kopal, supra note 78, at 14-20.
81. Actually, only in the case of the United States two specific acts were drafted
dealing with remote sensing, partially in domestic implementation of the Resolution:
Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act, Pub. L. 98-365, 98 Stat. 451 (1984); and
Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, Pub. L. 102-555, 106 Stat. 4163 (1992) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 5601 (2006)). SPACE LAw - BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS § E.III.4. (Karl-Heinz
Bockstiegel & Marietta Benko eds., 2008). But even in the United States, those acts
had to be complemented by policies of a more general nature to do full justice to the
broad nature of the principles contained in Resolution 41/65.
82. Resolution 4165, supra note 77, princ. XII.
83. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N.G.A. Res.
1803(XVII), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, U.N.G.A. Res. 3281(XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/19631 (Dec. 12, 1974); ANTONIO CAS-
SESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 399-401 (2001); CHIA-JuI CHENG, THE HIGHWAYS OF AIR AND
OUTER SPACE OVER ASIA 61-63 (1992).
2009]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
Essentially, the other states could use such superior-quality informa-
tion to obtain exploitation rights regarding the area concerned so eas-
ily and cheaply that the developing state at issue may not be able to
gauge the true value of such rights. As the developed states were
largely fundamentally opposed to any restriction on their freedom to
conduct space activities, including earth observation,8 4 and to gener-
ate information in the broadest sense of the word, this issue was hotly
debated.
Furthermore, regarding a key phrase found within Principle XII
of Resolution 41/65, primary data were defined as "[those] raw data
that are acquired by remote sensors borne by a space object and that
are transmitted or delivered to the ground from space by telemetry in
the form of electromagnetic signals, by photographic film, magnetic
tape or any other means."8 5 Additionally, Resolution 41/65 defined
the phrase processed data as "the products resulting from the process-
ing of the primary dataU needed to make such data usable."8 6 Resolu-
tion 41/65 also defined the phrase analysed information as "the
information resulting from the interpretation of processed data, in-
puts of data and knowledge from other sources."8 7
Finally, regarding the increasing potential of satellite earth ob-
servation data for use in the context of disaster mitigation, the two
principles regarding man-made threats and natural disasters should
be discussed. Such threats and disasters interfere with the basic
right, as recognised in certain broad parameters in Principle XII as
quoted above, for satellite operators to disseminate data under condi-
tions and with fees they would deem appropriate. On the one hand,
Resolution 41/65, dealing with man-made threats to the environment
belonging to the category of disasters, provides the following:
"[r]emote sensing shall promote the protection of the Earth's natural
environment. To this end, States participating in remote sensing ac-
tivities that have identified information in their possession that can
be used to avert any phenomenon harmful to the Earth's natural envi-
ronment shall disclose such information to States concerned."8 8
On the other hand, Resolution 41/65 deals with natural disasters
in a similar manner in that it provides:
84. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S.-U.K.-Russ.,
art. I, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] ("Outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all
States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with
international law.") (emphasis added).
85. Resolution 41165, supra note 77, princ. I(b).
86. Id. princ. I(c).
87. Id. princ. I(d).
88. Id. princ. X.
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Remote sensing shall promote the protection of mankind from
natural disasters. To this end, States participating in remote
sensing activities that have identified processed data and
analysed information in their possession that may be useful
to States affected by natural disasters, or likely to be affected
by impending natural disasters, shall transmit such data and
information to States concerned as promptly as possible.8 9
Pursuant to these two aforementioned principles, the Charter on
Space and Major Disasters has, as of 1999, established an institu-
tional structure for the relevant space agencies and satellite operators
in hopes of ensuring that data helpful in disaster prevention, mitiga-
tion, and rehabilitation activities are expedited to the relevant disas-
ter agencies as quickly, efficiently, and inexpensively as possible. 90
As part of generally recognized policy concerns and interests at all
European and individual state levels, European states, the European
Union, the European Meteorological Satellite Organisation ("EUMET-
SAT"), and, in particular, the European Space Agency ("ESA") play a
major role in ensuring that data helpful in disaster prevention, miti-
gation, and rehabilitation activities are quickly disseminated to disas-
ter agencies.
Finally, as far as international legal principles regarding the dis-
semination of satellite earth observation data is concerned, Resolution
40(Cg-XII) ("Resolution 40"), which was enunciated by the World Me-
teorological Organisation ("WMO") in 1995, becomes important. 91
Resolution 40, entitled "WMO policy and practice for the exchange of
meteorological and related data and products including guidelines on
relationships in commercial meteorological activities," inter alia pro-
vided the following:
(1) Members shall provide on a free and unrestricted basis es-
sential data and products which are necessary for the provi-
sion of services in support of the protection of life and
property and the well-being of all nations, particularly those
basic data and products, as, at a minimum, described in an-
89. Id. princ. XI.
90. Charter On Cooperation To Achieve The Coordinated Use Of Space Facilities
In The Event Of Natural Or Technological Disasters, Oct. 20, 2000, http://www.disas-
terscharter.org/chartere.html; Atsuyo Ito, Legal Aspects of the International Charter on
Space and Major Disasters, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 233-41 (2005).
91. RAY HARRIS, EARTH OBSERVATION DATA POLICY AND EUROPE 10 (2002); Conven-
tion of the World Meteorological Organization, Oct. 11, 1947, 5 A.T.S. 1950 [hereinafter
WMO Resolution 40]. The WMO Resolution preamble states WMO was created for the
purpose of "coordinating, standardizing, and improving world meteorological activities
and to encouraging an efficient exchange of meteorological information between coun-
tries in the aid of human activities." W. Balogh & P. Valabrega, EUMETSAT Interna-
tional Cooperation Activities, in CORINNE M. CONTANT JORGENSEN, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORTY-NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 192 (2007).
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nex 1 to this resolution, required to describe and forecast ac-
curately weather and climate, and support WMO
Programmes;
(2) Members should also provide the additional data and
products which are required to sustain WMO Programmes at
the global, regional, and national levels and, further, as
agreed, to assist other Members in the provision of meteoro-
logical services in their countries. While increasing the vol-
ume of data and products available to all Members by
providing these additional data and products, it is understood
that WMO Members may be justified in placing conditions on
their re-export for commercial purposes outside of the receiv-
ing country or group of countries forming a single economic
group, for reasons such as national laws or costs of
production;
(3) Members should provide to the research and education
communities, for their non-commercial activities, free and
unrestricted access to all data and products exchanged under
the auspices of WMO with the understanding that their com-
mercial activities are subject to the same conditions identified
in ADOPTS (2) above .... 92
Such major international commitments, even though strictly speaking
not of a binding legal nature, constituted the backbone of the major
policy documents drafted in the European context on access to, and
dissemination of, earth observation data generated by satellites.
VII. EUROPEAN EARTH OBSERVATION DATA POLICIES: ESA,
EUMETSAT, AND SPOT
Indeed, the need to draft data access policies for earth observation
data arose with the launch of the first European earth observation
satellites. The principles found in the United Nations General Assem-
bly containing the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth
from Outer Space of 1986 ("Resolution 41/65"), in particular with re-
gard to free and non-discriminatory access, sovereign rights, general
international law, and the World Meteorological Organisation's
("WMO") Resolution 40(Cg-XII) ("Resolution 40"), were key elements
of early European data access policies for earth observation data.
At the same time, the proof of the pudding was in the eating. For
example, formal adherence to the Principles of Resolution 41/65 was
one thing. However, some of the Principles of Resolution 41/65, at
least at a theoretical level, easily give rise to conflicting application
with other Principles of Resolution 41/65. Specifically, one question
which arose out of Resolution 41/65's conflicting principles was how
92. WMO Resolution 40, supra note 91.
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the principles were amalgamated at the policy level with the more
practically oriented interests of the organisations (principally the Eu-
ropean Space Agency ("ESA") and the European Meteorological Satel-
lite Organisation ("EUMETSAT")) involved and the individual
member states of such organisations. 93
Already, the early history of data access policies in Europe shows
some interesting examples as the present succinct survey will attempt
to show. It also shows that the broad sweep of the principles of Reso-
lution 41/65, for better or worse, allow individual states considerable
leeway with regard to satellite earth observation operators in inter-
preting and implementing data access policies.
The major issue here concerns the exact and authoritative inter-
pretation and implementation of the central concept of Resolution 41/
65's Principle XII ("Principle XII"), namely the "access [to remote sens-
ing data] on a non-discriminatory basis." First, Principle XII refer-
ences data access on a non-discriminatory basis which suggests that
discriminatory elements may still come into play if sufficiently justi-
fied by ulterior reasons. Thus, non-discrimination apparently is not
an absolute principle of Principle XII. Also, Principle XII's phrase
"and on reasonable cost terms" is noteworthy because it allows for con-
siderations of costs in regard to collecting, processing, and analysing
data access where such considerations would otherwise constitute
discrimination.9 4
Secondly, discrimination essentially entails making distinctions
between equal cases. That is, discrimination involves cases which are
not different from each other on those points which matter. 95 How-
ever, this still begs for a question, or rather several questions.96 Is it
discrimination to allow developing states better terms of satellite data
access than developed states? Is it discrimination to allow satellite
data access to befriended states while refusing it to inimical ones? Is
it discrimination to allow satellite data access to states who co-fund
your satellites on better terms than those which do not? What is
equal? Which points matter and which points do not matter? Perhaps
93. Lesley J. Smith & Catherine Doldirina, Remote Sensing Data: Some Critical
Comments on the Current State of Regulation and Reflections on Reform, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 259-60 (2007);
Marco Ferrazzani, The Policies in Remote Sensing and the Practices of the European
Space Agency, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 506, 510-12 (2006).
94. Ram Jakhu, International Law Governing the Acquisition and Dissemination of
Satellite Imagery, 29 J. SPACE L. 87-90 (2003).
95. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "discrimination"
as "[a] failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found
between those favored and those not favored.").
96. CHA-JUI CHENG, THE HIGHWAYS OF AIR AND OUTER SPACE OVER ASIA 67-70
(1992).
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most importantly, is there a uniform answer to the aforementioned
questions or does everyone have their own interpretation and does
everyone implement Resolution 41/65 accordingly?
Thirdly, the focus of Principle XII on the sensed State might also
allow for fundamentally different applications of its contents in the
broader context. This focus of Principle XII is obviously a consequence
of the then-prevailing dichotomy between advocates who believe in
free remote satellite sensing and the freedom of information gathering
and advocates of permanent sovereignty over territory and natural re-
sources. The latter claimed either preferential or exclusive rights to
the data concerning their own territory.9 7 Sometimes the latter even
claimed the right to prohibit the collection of data by remote sensing
satellites altogether.98
Indeed, the principle of non-discrimination as provided by Resolu-
tion 41/65 focuses on not discriminating between sensed states and
third states interested in a particular set of satellite earth observation
data. 99 In addition, in view of the fact that developing countries
would be most likely to find themselves only in the role of a sensed
state, positive discrimination of developing states in a sense is actu-
ally recommended. This Article will now analyze how the two princi-
pal European organisations involved in satellite data gathering have
interpreted Resolution 41/65's principle of non-discrimination using
what limited legal instruments they have available if the case arises.
As for ESA, the first comprehensive satellite remote programme
started in the early 1980s. Specifically, ESA's first comprehensive
satellite remote programme, inclusive of satellite operations, data
handling, and data distribution, concerned the two European Remote
Sensing Satellites. These two European Remote Sensing Satellites
were known as ERS-1 and ERS-2. On the one hand, the data policies
for both European Remote Sensing missions were based on the idea
that states should have free access to the data on an open and non-
discriminatory basis. Such data policies reflected at least the spirit of
Resolution 41/65. On the other hand, ESA's ownership and full title to
97. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.S.-U.K-Russ.,
arts. I, III, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; see also
supra note 81. It should be reiterated here the latter freedom would be but one specific
manifestation of the more general freedom of conducting space activities, as long as the
space activity fell within the rather loose parameters of the regime of outer space law,
including general international law, as applicable.
98. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 97, arts. I, III.
99. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A.
Res. 41165, princs. II, III, IV, XIII, U.N. Doc. A/RES/4165 (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter
Resolution 41165].
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the data, using the legal instrument of copyright, 0 0 was used to re-
strict access to the data wherever and whenever free access to them
was not deemed to be reasonable and desirable by ESA. Free access to
the data apparently was not considered to be an absolute principle.
Upon closer inspection, it appears that ESA considered the core
element of non-discrimination to lie in freedom of access to ERS data
for everyone, in a principled way, through a non-exclusive licensing
system. Essentially, ESA must have reasoned that so long as the ERS
data was not the exclusive property of an individual state who could
restrict its availability to any other state, Resolution 41/65's non-dis-
crimination principle was met. Thus, ESA used an extensive licensing
scheme, either through so-called Principal Investigators or directly to
users, as an extension of its ownership and full title to the data for the
purpose of providing public availability through recognised channels
and licenses. Finally, it should be noted that ESA's imposition of fees
on states wanting the data formed an important aspect of the licens-
ing system.
Even as the text of Resolution 41/65 has remained the same,
ESA's relevant interpretations and implementation of Resolution 41/
65 has changed considerably in terms of drafting appropriate data ac-
cess policies for the second comprehensive satellite earth observation
programme, Envisat. 0 1 ESA's Earth Observation Programme Board
approved the Envisat Data Policy ("EDP") in February 1998 after
three revisions.1 0 2 The EDP "defines an overall set of policies and
rules for access to all Envisat data and the associated products and
services. 1 0 3 Registration of Envisat with the United Nations Secre-
tary-General, in conformity with the Registration Convention,' 0 4 has
the purpose of confirming ESA's unequivocal ownership and title to
use intellectual property rights mechanisms as the major data policy
tool. Again, further implementation of ESA's property rights in the
satellite earth observation data sector takes place through a non-ex-
clusive licensing system.
100. See Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency art. 111(2)-
(4), May 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 864 [hereinafter ESA Convention] (regarding the handling
of intellectual property rights, including copyrights, in the context of products developed
by, or within the framework of, ESA).
101. RAY HARRIS, EARTH OBSERVATION DATA POLICY AND EUROPE 13-14 (2002).
102. EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, THE ENVISAT DATA POLICY (2000) (on file with
author).
103. ENVISAT DATA POLICY, supra note 102, § 1.1.
104. See ESA Convention, supra note 100, arts. II, VIIMl); SPACE LAW -BASIC LEGAL
DOCUMENTS § A.1V.4.2. (Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel & Marietta Benko eds., 2008). ESA
has accepted all rights and obligations of the Convention so as to become a de facto
party to it by its Declaration of January 2, 1979.
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Envisat data are to be "available in an open and non-discrimina-
tory way" and in explicit conformity with Resolution 41/65.105 Addi-
tionally, "Envisat distributing entities shall provide services to users
in a fair and non-discriminatory way."10 6 The relativity of Resolution
41/65's non-discrimination principle immediately becomes clear when
further details are provided regarding the system of distributing En-
visat data. For instance, the EDP states that "[n]ationally registered
... entities from Participating States shall have a higher priority than
those from non-Participating States in the selection process for dis-
tributing entities, in absence of other elements of discrimination." 10 7
Thus, it is recognised that some sort of discrimination is already in-
volved in selecting national distributing entities for the purpose of En-
visat data dissemination. Furthermore, it is recognised that other
forms of discrimination might also be allowed regardless of Resolution
41/65's non-discrimination principle.
From the further details of the Envisat data distribution scheme,
two such forms of discrimination come to the forefront quite promi-
nently. The two forms of discrimination found within the Envisat
data distribution scheme relate to the two fundamental forms of data
dissemination that arise in cases where remote sensing satellites are
run by operational entities that also control the dissemination of the
satellite data. The first form of discrimination concerns distribution
on Earth, that is, dissemination of satellite data after the satellite
data has been received, and where appropriate, processed. The second
form of discrimination concerns distribution from space, in other
words the direct reception of data by other entities authorised by the
relevant operational entity.
For the first form of discrimination, a distinction is made between
Category 1 use, use for research and applications development sup-
port, and Category 2 use, use comprising all uses other than uses for
research and applications development support.1 0 8 Category 2 uses
include operational and commercial uses.10 9 The distinction between
Category 1 uses and Category 2 uses is normally realized through the
pricing structure of the data. For Category 1 uses, users will only pay
the price "at or near the cost of reproduction of the data."110 However,
the fee for Category 1 uses is waived if the applicable project is either
105. ENVISAT DATA POLICY, supra note 102, § 2.
106. Id.
107. Id. § 1.6.
108. Id. § 2.2.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 3.2. Obviously, such waivers would be at issue, inter alia, where in kind
exchange of data with other operators is concerned, subject to determination that such
cooperation justified the waivers concerned. Id.
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approved in the framework of the Envisat programme or by the Earth
Observation Programme Board.1 1 ' With respect to Category 2 uses,
ESA will fix the price of data at which it will be sold to distributing
entities who are then allowed to set their own (higher) prices when
selling the data further on in order to make a profit. 112
The extent to which distributing entities will, in law or in fact, be
forced to implement any non-discrimination principle is difficult to
distil from the texts. Distributing entities are explicitly allowed to de-
fine their own pricing policies, but any further distribution of the data
by other entities must take place in accordance with the EDP. Thus,
the distribution of the data by entities other than the distributing en-
tities must adhere to the non-discrimination principle of Resolution
41165. However, ESA maintains some control over the pricing of the
data through its right to fix a ceiling level for the market price. This
rather rough tool is the only means to force distributing entities to
adhere to Resolution 41/65's non-discrimination principle in terms of
pricing. 1 13 The major justification for this limited level of control
seems to be the non-exclusive character of any license, similarly to
what was the case with the ERS data, and the limited time-span for
any license.
The second form of discrimination arises where there is a possibil-
ity that ground stations could receive data directly from the Envisat
satellite. The national ground receiving stations of the states partici-
pating in the Envisat programme have the right to receive Envisat
data without having to pay a fee, but these states have an obligation
to implement the EDP in their respective territories in good faith. 114
Additionally, states receiving Envisat data without paying a fee have
an obligation not to compete with commercial distribution mecha-
nisms involving the data outside their respective territories. 1 1 5 Con-
versely, stations in states not participating in the Envisat programme,
referred to in the texts as foreign stations, are charged an access fee as
a matter of principle. 1 16
In short, ESA adheres in name to Resolution 41/65's Principle
XII's non-discrimination principle. Furthermore, ESA can justify any
discrimination in its data access policy by pointing at the fundamen-
tally different cases underlying such acts of discrimination. Moreover,
no reference has been made to the special interests of either sensed
states or developing states. In fact, the possibility even remains to re-
111. Id.
112. Id. § 3.3.
113. Id. § 3.3.
114. Id. §§ 1.6, 6.3.2.
115. Id.
116. Id. §§ 3.5, 6.3.3.
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spect, in any particular case, the special rights and interests of sensed
states or developing states. Next, this Article's analysis will look at
the other European organisation principally involved in satellite earth
observation activities, EUMETSAT. Additionally, this Article's analy-
sis will establish that the data access policies developed for the first
satellite system and the data access policies developed for the second
satellite system are similar.
The first fundamental and comprehensive EUMETSAT Data Pol-
icy of June 1991 focused on categories of users with different rights of
access, as opposed to uses, while continuing to adhere to the principle
of free exchange of certain data amongst the members of the WMO.1 17
EUMETSAT's Data Policy distinguished between three types of users:
the national meteorological services of the member states (who were
entitled to free full use and distribution, as long as within the national
territory), the national meteorological services of non-member states
(who were offered restricted free use of relevant date for internal pur-
poses only), and all other users (who could obtain relevant data at ne-
gotiable, presumably more or less commercial, prices). Similar to
ESA, EUMETSAT held the copyright to the data. EUMETSAT's copy-
right protection was used as the principal tool to implement its poli-
cies and to achieve the desired balance between its responsibility for
global research and the character of Meteosat data as a special re-
source. Specifically, EUMETSAT applied encryption to the data since
1994 to help prevent any circumvention of the copyright. 1 18
However, a new EUMETSAT data policy resolution was adopted
in July 1998.119 Since 1991, perhaps the most important quasi-legis-
lative event at the global level of meteorological satellite remote sens-
ing data policies was the promulgation of WMO's Resolution 40. The
dichotomy between scientific data of public value and commercial use
of satellite data had increased in importance. WMO's Resolution 40
had the effect of strengthening EUMETSAT in its resolve to continue
to apply a data distribution system reflecting this dichotomy. Thus,
the "need to preserve the benefits of EUMETSAT membership" was
now explicitly mentioned. 120
Therefore, under EUMETSAT's new data policy as per the 1998
resolution, the national meteorological services of the member states
were to receive all Meteosat data for free, but only "for their Official
Duty use."12 1 Principle I of those data policy principles, further de-
117. KEVIN MADDERS, A NEW FORCE AT A NEW FRONTIER 519-20 (1997).
118. Jakhu, supra note 94, at 84-85.
119. Resolution EUMETSAT Principles on Data Policy, EUJMC/98/Res. IV (1998)
[hereinafter Resolution EUMETSATI.
120. Id. pmbl., para. 8.
121. Id. princ. I.
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fines "['olfficial [diuty' as encompassing all internal activities of the
national meteorological service as well as those "external activities...
resulting from legal, governmental or intergovernmental require-
ments relating to defence, civil aviation[,] and the safety of life and
property."12 2 In other words, a national meteorological service may no
longer avail itself of EUMETSAT data for free if the data is to be used
in its commercial activities. Furthermore, Principle III of that same
EUMETSAT resolution provides that the national meteorological ser-
vices' commercial activities are to be treated in an equivalent way to
other commercially operating entities.
Principles IV through VII of EUMETSAT's data policy resolution
provides that certain sets of data are to be provided for free, namely to
all WMO members as following from WMO's Resolution 40, to na-
tional meteorological services of non-EUMETSAT member states if
the data is used for official duty business, for research and educational
projects per se, and to the European Centre for Medium-Range
Weather Forecasts ("ECMWF") for ECMWF's own use. 12 3 All other
users of EUMETSAT data can receive the data, products, and services
for a fee which may be waived under conditions defined by the
EUMETSAT Council. 124 EUMETSAT's ownership over the relevant
data, including the intellectual property rights, was the key tool the
organisation used to implement Resolution 40.125 Specifically,
EUMETSAT's intellectual property rights were used to implement a
licensing scheme with respect to all other data and products.
Most interesting from the perspective of Resolution 41/65, and its
emphasis on the needs and interests of developing countries in the
framework of data distribution on a non-discriminatory basis, is the
third Annex. The third Annex deals with the various fees wherever
applicable. 12 6 Specifically, a twofold fee structure is applied to na-
tional meteorological services of non-EUMETSAT member states who
want EUMETSAT data. For those states with a per-capita gross na-
tional product below or equal to US $3,500, data for official duty usage
are provided to the national meteorological services for free. In 2007-
2008, states with higher per-capita gross national products would be
required to pay 60,000 C annually for hourly Meteosat data, 80,000 e
for half-hourly Meteosat data, and 100,000 C for quarter-hourly Mete-
osat data. Thus, the payment scheme placed upon non-EUMETSAT
122. Id.
123. W. Balogh & P. Valabrega, EUMETSAT International Cooperation Activities,
in CORINNE M. CONTANT JORGENSEN, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 191 (2007).
124. Resolution EUMETSAT, supra note 119, princ. VIII.
125. Id. I 3.
126. Id.
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member states presents a clear picture of positive discrimination of
developing states, albeit only as far as official duty usage is concerned.
However, positive discrimination applies regardless of whether the
national meteorological service is that of a sensed state or not.
Finally, a few words on the national satellite earth observation
system briefly discussed before: the French SPOT system entailed
marketing and distribution that were controlled by the private French
company SPOTImage. 127 Also for SPOT and SPOTImage, the key tool
used in the implementation of data policies is the use of intellectual
property rights, specifically copyrights, to control the reservation of
data where required or desired and to control downstream distribu-
tion of the data where allowable.
Interestingly, SPOTImage considered adopting different rates for
different user categories of data to be unfeasible because such a policy
could result in leakage of data and potentially come into conflict with
the Principles of Resolution 41/65. Instead, SPOTImage considered
external compensation mechanisms more appropriate in balancing the
justified need of scientific communities to obtain relevant data with
the fact that not all scientific communities were in a position to afford
the commercial prices of the data. At the same time, differentiating
between use for distribution and final use took care of the commercial
interests of SPOTImage in that its own markets should not be under-
cut by its own downstream clients re-selling data.
VIII. EUROPEAN EARTH OBSERVATION DATA LEGISLATION:
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY/UNION
As indicated, both from the point of substance (general economics
as opposed to space) and from the point of structure (law dominant
over policies), the European Community, then European Union, ap-
proaches satellite earth observation fundamentally differently from
the European Space Agency ("ESA"), the European Meteorological
Satellite Organisation ("EUMETSAT"), and the member states (which
so far, with the exception of Germany as discussed later, have not es-
tablished specific national laws dealing with remote sensing).
The European Community's involvement started in the late 1980s
when the major project of finalising the Internal Market required en-
visaging the monitoring of a number of specific parameters. Most no-
tably, some of the parameters monitored as part of finalising the
Internal Market included fraudulent claims to obtain unjustified agri-
cultural subsidies, the quotas on the fishing of certain stocks in order
127. Smith & Doldirina, supra note 93, at 260; Philippe Clerc, French Regulation
and Practice, in LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING ACTIVTIES 33-42
(1998).
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to prevent over-fishing, and violations of environmental legislation.
Original plans for the European Community to become more involved
in space included launching its own monitoring satellite, under the
project name Green Eye in the Sky, to monitor violations of environ-
mental legislation were quickly downsized to leasing an instrument on
the French SPOT-4 satellite. 128 Later, developments in international
environment treaties, such as the Convention on Climate Change 129
and the Kyoto Protocol, 130 continued to emphasize the need for moni-
toring through the use of satellites. However, the European Commu-
nity never followed through on this particular venture.
The European Community then became involved in a specific as-
pect of earth observation which was starting to cause some concern in
Europe. This aspect required a legal approach. Within Europe (and
beyond the specific context of SPOT and SPOTImage), the initial topic
of copyrights in the context of satellite earth observation was consid-
ered a matter for ESA and perhaps EUMETSAT. Specifically, the
ESA Convention stated that ESA "shall, with regard to the resulting
inventions and technical data, secure such rights as may be appropri-
ate for the protection of its interests, of those of the Member States
participating in the relevant programme, and of those of persons and
bodies under their jurisdiction." 13 1 However, it rapidly became clear
that ESA's own competencies were too limited for establishment of a
more comprehensive legal regime. Specifically, it was clear that ESA
could only effectuate relevant protection of satellite earth observation
data through, and as far as could be provided by, individual contracts.
When potential applications of earth observation data became
more known, the European Commission also became interested in
such potential applications. Specifically, the European Commission
became interested in the possibility that intellectual property rights
over the satellite earth observation data could be used as anti-compet-
itive tools. For example, individual companies could use copyrights to
sell licenses for exclusive access or usage in specific satellite earth ob-
servation data in national territories. Thus, individual companies
could artificially carve up the Internal Market into nationally sepa-
rated markets in contravention of relevant European Union princi-
128. Simonetta Cheli & Paul H. Tuinder, European Space Policy, Institutional De-
velopments, 21 AIR & SPACE L. 54-57 (1996); Paul H. Tuinder, Issues of Protection of
Remote Sensing Data - European Union Developments, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE FIELD OF PROTECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF REMOTE SENSING DATA 22-23 (1994).
129. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994).
130. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention On Climate
Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/19977/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1997).
131. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency art. 111(3), May
30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 864 [hereinafter ESA Convention].
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ples. 132 Therefore, the European Commission initiated a study that
resulted in the recommendation that the then-drafted European Com-
munity Directive on the protection of databases be made applicable to
satellite earth observation data.13 3
However, satellite earth observation data was hard to legally pro-
tect due to the way in which the concept of copyrights had been devel-
oped historically. One of the main problems with raw data, in the
context of copyright law, is that it does not easily satisfy the original-
ity criterion required to qualify for copyright protection in many juris-
dictions. Specifically, there usually is no creative human intervention
involved in producing raw data. The lack of creative human interven-
tion involved in producing raw data is especially prevalent if the data
are generated automatically or in a pre-programmed fashion. Collec-
tions of raw, corrected, or treated data also fail to satisfy the original-
ity criterion required for copyright protection if there is no creative
human intervention involved in producing collections of such data.
Still, for want of better legal tools, most operators in Europe used
copyright protection to protect the data that resulted from activities in
outer space. Of course, in the absence of any specific European Com-
munity legislation on the matter, risks abounded that protection could
differ between European states due to varying national copyright laws
and/or varying interpretations of such copyright laws.'13 4
Duly amending the European Community Directive, which was
then being drafted, offered a solution; the result was Directive 96/9.135
Directive 96/9 established a sui generis-right of data base protec-
tion.136 Directive 96/9 obliges the member states of the European
Union to include databases in their national intellectual property
rights regimes in conformity with the parameters Directive 96/9 pro-
vides. Directive 96/9 applies both to nationals (including companies)
132. RALPH A. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 115-18, 281 (2005).
133. This concerned the so-called Gaudrat Study of April 1993, which concluded the
best way to effectuate any protection of remote sensing data would be to bring them
under the heading of databases, rather than copyrights, for instance. See also Paul H.
Tuinder, Issues of Protection of Remote Sensing Data - European Union Developments,
in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF PROTECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF REMOTE
SENSING DATA 28 (1994); Philippe Gaudrat & Paul H. Tuinder, The Legal Status of Re-
mote Sensing Data: Issues of Access and Distribution, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER
THE NEXT 30 YEARS 354-58 (1997).
134. The existing international treaties on copyrights, often of near-global scope,
were also ill-equipped to deal with the specific requirements of satellite earth observa-
tion data providers. This concerned treaties such as the Berne Convention For the Pro-
tection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 126 A.T.S. 1901, The Universal
Copyright Convention cmd. 8912, Sept. 6, 1952, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, and the Copyright
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (entered into force Mar. 6, 2002).
135. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Legal Protec-
tion of Databases, Mar. 11, 1996, O.J. 77/20 [hereinafter Database Protection Directive].
136. Id.
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from European Union member states undertaking such activities and
to such activities if undertaken from the territory of any of the Euro-
pean Union member states.1 3 7
In terms of substance, Directive 96/9 protects creative databases
under copyright law and creates a unique protection (the sui generis-
right) for those databases which do not meet the requirement of origi-
nality as long as they are individually accessible and require a sub-
stantial investment to be generated. In other words, the sui generis-
right extends protection to databases containing material not other-
wise protected by copyright. As a result, data derived from activities
in outer space and assembled in an original database are protected
within the territory of the European Union member states. As Direc-
tive 96/9's terms require, all European Union member states have
transposed Directive 96/9 into national legislation.
The protection offered by Directive 96/9 consists of two sets of
rights, the extraction right and the re-utilisation right.'38 Both the
extraction right and the re-utilisation right principally rest with the
creator/owner of the database. i 39 The extraction right refers to the
right to permanently or temporarily transfer all, or a substantial part,
of the contents of a database to another medium by any means or in
any form. Likewise, the re-utilisation right refers to the right to make
available to the public all, or a substantial part, of the contents of a
database by: (i) distributing copies of the data; (ii) renting the data;
(iii) transmitting the data on-line; (iv) or transmitting the data in any
other manner.
The first time a right holder sells, or consents to sell, a copy of a
database within the European Union, the right holder exhausts the
right to control resale of that copy. However, this idea might raise
some special questions. The idea would mean in principle that the
owner of satellite data could only sell the information to one user be-
cause he or she could not prevent that user from making the satellite
data freely available to everyone else. This question is highly relevant
as the commercial model for many earth observation activities of
course relies on preventing resale in principle because the commercial
operator wishes to profit himself from such resale, rather than his
first-in-line customer.
The first-time-exhaustion referred to, however, means exactly
that; the point-of-departure is that the law itself does not protect fur-
ther than the first sale. If one does not want to accept that, one should
simply, by contract, preclude any licensee from reselling the data by
137. Id. arts. 11(1), (2).
138. Id. art. 7(2).
139. Id.
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allowing data usage only for internal purposes. This is, as a matter of
fact, a rather common phenomenon.
The European Community/European Union, with its policy-
driven focus on liberalising markets and establishing a level playing
field within Europe, addressed this piece of harmonising legislation to
an issue of particular relevance for commercial operators. Intellectual
property rights protect commercial operators, allowing satellite earth
observation to possibly become a profitable business. The European
Community/European Union addressed the intellectual property
rights of commercial operators by trying to preclude a situation where
operators from different member states would receive different levels
of protection in different national markets.
IX. EARTH OBSERVATION DATA LEGISLATION IN EUROPE -
THE EXAMPLE OF GERMANY
As mentioned, Germany is the only member state of the European
Union (and the European Space Agency ("ESA")) possessing its own
national law on remote sensing. Germany's law, however, focuses on
one particular aspect of earth observation data: the downstream po-
tential of such data becoming sensitive from a security perspective. 140
Germany's focus on the protective aspect of observation data is not an
accident. This area is relevant for earth observation because the Eu-
ropean Union, so far, has made little inroads into the sovereignty of
member states to regulate such issues on a domestic level. 14 1
In 2000, Germany faced the security relevance of radar data for
the first time when it participated in the bilateral Shuttle Radar To-
pography Mission ("SRTM") project with the United States. At that
time, Germany opted for a unique non-transferable license for the
data in question to enable the German Space Agency (Deutsches Zen-
trum ffir Luft- und Raumfahrt ("DLR")) to exercise oversight over all
users for security purposes. The law prevents users from further dis-
tributing the data without authorisation.
This non-transferable license system, however, was found to be
incompatible with large-scale commercial dissemination. Such dis-
semination was envisaged when preparing for the launch and opera-
tions of the first German earth observation satellite with fundamental
140. Michael Gerhard & Bernard Schmidt-Tedd, Germany Enacts Legislation on the
Distribution of Remote Sensing Satellite Data, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 411-15 (2008).
141. The main exception, so far, concerns the issue of exports of dual-use sensitive
goods, where since 2000 a rudimentary regime exists on the European level, partly over-
laying the individual export controls of the member states. Council Regulation Setting
Up a Community Regime for the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Items and Technology,
June 22, 2000, No. 1334/2000/EC, O.J. 159/1.
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private participation through a Public-Private Partnership ("PPP"),
the TerraSAR-X. At the same time, Germany developed TerraSAR-X,
in part, with U.S. technology. In using U.S. technology, Germany had
to comply with U.S. security interests as part of broader German se-
curity, international legal, and foreign policy concerns.
142
Because TerraSAR-X is a PPP project based on joint investments
by the public sector (DLR) and the private sector (Infoterra, a com-
pany of the EADS Astrium consortium), Germany adopted an ap-
proach where DLR retained ownership of the satellite and was the
first organisation to receive and handle all data TerraSAR-X gener-
ated. After DLR received the data, Infoterra received comprehensive
copies of the data so both partners have a complete set of data in their
archives. Next, DLR held the exclusive rights to scientific use of the
TerraSAR-X data, whereas Infoterra held the exclusive commercial-
isation rights. The latter included both private and public sector data
requests.
This somewhat sweeping classification (of commercialisation
rights) was based on the idea that the commercial sector would need a
broad potential clientele to grow into a healthy economic sector. Pre-
sumably, Infoterra would be more efficient in providing such data
than any public sector stakeholder because of the commercial astute-
ness of a proper commercial operator and the economies of scale and
scope which widely permitted use would allow.14 3 Because a substan-
tial market for earth observation data should arise, a legal regime
that precluded the data provider from accessing sensitive data at the
outset would not be suitable.
While the German ministries responsible for defence and security
took no share in such investment, but reserved the right to purchase
data as required for their specific purposes upon completion of the sys-
tem, these ministries insisted on maintaining a measure of control to
ensure Germany's national security and to ensure related interna-
tional obligations 144 would not be compromised by TerraSAR-X's oper-
ations or downstream data distribution activities.
Both policy concerns, applied in an ad hoc-manner to TerraSAR-
X, were transformed into proper law by means of the German Act on
142. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2006); United States Munitions
List, 22 C.F.R. § 121 (2008).
143. In the United States the same approach has led even the military at various
points to use civil/commercial satellite services providers for their purposes, such as for
in satellite communications and earth observation. The same philosophy was behind
the United States decision in 1984 to commercialize satellites by means of the private
data marketing and sales company EOSat. The same applies to several United King-
dom PPP's in military satellite communications.
144. This would refer in particular to the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Con-
trols for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Dec. 19, 1995.
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Satellite Data Security ("GASDS") of 23 November 2007. The GASDS
became effective 1 December 2007.145 The GASDS distinguished be-
tween the relatively minor amount of earth observation data poten-
tially detrimental to national security or foreign policy interests and
all remaining earth observation data, the distribution and/or com-
mercialisation of which that could be allowed without risk and hence
should be allowed. The GASDS enabled German operators to develop
satellite earth observation applications into a commercially viable sec-
tor by providing transparency and certainty to concerned companies.
Ratione materiae, the German Act on Satellite Data Security
(hereinafter the "Act") covers so-called high-grade14 6 space-based
earth observation systems. These high-grade space-based earth ob-
servation systems are technically able to generate data that may be
detrimental to national security or to foreign policy interests. The cri-
teria for what constitutes a high-grade space-based earth observation
system, therefore, are provided in the Act itself while the precise lim-
its of these criteria are to be provided by means of a statutory ordi-
nance yet to be drafted.
The backbone of the Act is the establishment of a control proce-
dure for the dissemination of satellite data from the high-grade earth
observation systems. 1 47 The license structure is tuned to the key is-
sue of controlling or directly accessing the relevant data as the satel-
lites generate the data. The Act requires a license from the operator of
the system 148 as well as a license from the data provider desiring to
disseminate such data, whether he acts as the operator or not, as long
as the data is received more or less directly from the satellite. 14 9 The
license obligation consequently pertains to primary data providers
such as Infoterra or the German Remote Sensing Data Center (part of
DLR), but the license obligation generally does not pertain to typical
earth observation service providers further downstream such as
value-adding firms or data resellers. The Act effectively controls se-
curity interests at the source by regulating only the first level of dis-
semination by data providers either controlling the satellites (hence
qualifying as operators 150 ) or directly accessing the relevant data
themselves.
145. Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz [German Act on Satellite Data Security], Nov.
2007, BGB1. I, no. 58 (F.R.G.).
146. The German term is hochwertig.
147. German Act on Satellite Data Security, art. 2(1)(6).
148. Id. arts. 3-10. Article 3 provides for the license obligation, as such.
149. Id. arts. 11-20. Article 11 provides for the license obligation as such. Article
2(1)(3) defines the data provider as any person who disseminates data generated by a
high-grade earth observation system.
150. The definition of operator is "the person who has the control of the earth re-
mote sensing system under his own responsibility." Id. art. 2(1)(1).
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As for the operator, if a space-based earth remote sensing system
is a high-grade system under the Act, Article 3 of the Act requires the
operator to acquire a license from the Federal Office of Economics and
Export Control. Article 3's requirement that an operator must acquire
a license from the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control ap-
plies to German nationals and legal persons or associations of persons
under German law, to foreign legal persons or foreign associations of
persons with their head office in Germany, and to cases where inalter-
able sequences of instructions to command the orbital system are
transmitted from within Germany.15 1
Following from similar security-related purposes, any relevant ac-
quisition of data by foreign nationals, by legal persons or associations
of persons under foreign law, or by legal persons or associations of
persons under German law in which foreign nationals or legal persons
or associations of persons under foreign law hold at least twenty-five
percent of the voting rights specifically requires notification and re-
quires a permit if such a take-over would otherwise dispense with the
need for an operator license under Article 3(1) of the Act. 152 This a
priori-form of control is necessary to achieve the security objectives of
the Act because foreign persons or entities could more easily avoid su-
pervision, access, and possibly criminal prosecution by German au-
thorities - even if simply because they may be abroad by the time any
suspicion as to their activities arises.
The main thrust of the Act's regulatory regime, however, may be
that the primary data provider actually disseminates earth observa-
tion data subject to security-interest related controls of the German
authorities. By definition the Act could be made applicable only to
operations somehow falling within German jurisdiction, essentially to
the extent those operations occurred in Germany itself. Thus, the Act
covers all German citizens and organizations under German law,
those foreign companies either domiciled in, or essentially exercising
effective control over their operations within Germany, and all compa-
nies disseminating data from within German territory. In other
words, the Act includes all companies for which the Act can be effec-
tively enforced.15 3
151. Id. art. 1(1)(1). In addition to the operator, the persons who have access to the
essential operational elements of the system must be considered "reliable" for the pur-
poses of the Act. To allow a better assessment of such reliability, a basic security check
is carried out in accordance with the German Security Clearance Check Act. The opera-
tional premises must be adequately secured to prevent unauthorized entry and the
transmission of commands to the satellite must be safeguarded by means of high-level
encryption. In this connection, procedures certified by the Federal Office for Informa-
tion Security are used. Id. art. 4(1)(3), (4)(2).
152. Id. art. 10(1), -(2).
153. Id. art. 1(1)(2).
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Next, under its license, a primary data provider is obliged to re-
view requests for data transactions on a case-by-case basis by means
of a so-called sensitivity check.' 5 4 The data provider must carry out
this sensitivity check in accordance with fixed procedures and clearly
defined criteria. These fixed procedures and defined criteria leave lit-
tle room for the data provider's discretionary assessment of whether
any potential endangerment of German security interests exists. 15 5
Where the sensitivity check classifies the specific data request as
non-sensitive, the data provider can provide the requested data prod-
ucts without additional consideration by the Federal Office of Econom-
ics and Export Control. Additionally, where the sensitivity check
classifies the specific data request as non-sensitive, the data provider
may allow the customer's receiving station to download the data.
If the security check classifies the customer's data request as sen-
sitive, the Act initially prohibits the provider from complying with the
customer's request. If that occurs, the Federal Office of Economics
and Export Control examines the documentation the data provider
provides in accordance with Article 18.156 Subsequently, the Federal
Office of Economics and Export Control decides whether to issue or
deny a permit in conformity with Article 19 within one month 15 7
based upon whether compliance with the customer request would en-
danger relevant German security interests. 15s
The Federal Office of Economics and Export Control might also
rule out risks to German security interests by granting a permit that
allows the data provider to alter the original plans for data delivery
154. Id. art. 17.
155. Id. art. 17(3). The criteria for the sensitivity check take account of the relevant
technical parameters and factors such as the information content, form of processing
used observed target area, the customer requesting the data and the ground stations to
which data are to be transmitted, and the length of time between data acquisition and
the processing of the data request. Id. art. 17(2).
156. Article 18(1) provides for an extensive list of documents covering the actual
request: (1) the persons who prospectively comes into contact with the data as provided
for in the request and their usual places of residence; (2) checking the identity of the
requesting party; (3) the procedure and the results of the check of the sensitivity of the
request under Article 17(1) in conjunction with the provisions of a legal ordinance under
Article 17(3); (4) the data generation order placed with the operator of the high-grade
earth remote sensing system; (5) the receiving logs of ground segments; (6) the details of
encryption processes, including codes used and code management; (7) reports of the
processing sequences of the ground segment; (8) metadata on the data, in particular,
target area, time of generation of the data, sensor operating mode and data-processing
parameters; (9) transfer logs or delivery notes including delivery confirmations with
regard to compliance with the request; and (10) invoices.
157. German Act on Satellite Data Security, art. 19(3).
158. Article 19(2) provides the permit shall be granted if the dissemination of data
in the case at hand does not harm the vital security interests of Germany, does not
disturb the peaceful co-existence of states, and does not substantially impair German
foreign relations.
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following the request. For example, the data provider could alter the
plans by applying lowered resolution, time delay, reduced processing
quality of the data, or the omission of certain target areas.15 9 In such
cases, the authorities would authorize the permit contingent upon the
required changes to the data delivery plan.
The Act further protects fundamental government interests by re-
serving a right of prior tasking for governmental purposes as well as a
right of prior dissemination of data to the government. However, us-
ing such priority rights is restricted to rare cases of national crisis,
cases spelled out precisely by Article 21.160 In both cases, authorities
may offer to remunerate the data provider based on relevant average
market prices for the costs incurred to comply with these priority
requirements. 16 1
In any event, military and intelligence satellites do not fall within
the scope of application of the Act. Government authorities, who oper-
ate the satellites concerned, appropriately keep the satellite data se-
cret. Moreover, the Act does, or may, exempt satellite systems if they
are subject to comparable foreign security arrangements. 16 2 This spe-
cifically includes cases where the applicable law of another member
state of the European Union permits operations of a high-grade satel-
lite earth observation system when the other member state's law im-
poses obligations related to the interests protected by Germany's Act.
In terms of implementation, TerraSAR-X encompasses more than
2000 sensitive data requests which seems relatively high given that
the TerraSAR-X satellite only became ready for operation in 2008.
The Federal Office of Economics and Export Control was able to grant
permits for about ninety-nine percent of applications. The Federal Of-
fice of Economics and Export Control will use its experience gathered
thus far in determining the criteria of the sensitivity check in the
forthcoming statutory ordinance so that the criteria continue to sup-
port the dissemination of data.
159. German Act on Satellite Data Security, arts. 11(2), 16.
160. This concerns the events of collective military actions under the auspices of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of national defense urgencies following the
German Constitution, of an internal state of emergency or other tensions conforming to
the German Constitution, and of danger arising to the German military or civil forces
deployed in a foreign state or to employees of the diplomatic service employed at Ger-
man embassies abroad working to counter a concrete impairment to the external secur-
ity of Germany.
161. German Act on Satellite Data Security, art. 23.
162. Id. art. 1(2).
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X. MORE EUROPEAN POLICY THAN LAW: TOWARDS GMES/
KOPERNIKUS
In 2001, the European Community/European Union decided upon
the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security ("GMES") pro-
ject, the second major European space project undertaken jointly by
the European Space Agency ("ESA") and the European Commis-
sion.' 6 3 The European Commission concluded that public purposes
and the likely benefits and spin-offs for the private sector necessitated
an independent European capability in earth observation. 164 From a
global perspective, while GMES's aims were ambitious both in sub-
stantial and institutional terms, GMES could allow Europe to contrib-
ute to the Global Earth Observation System of Systems ("GEOSS").
The GMES project, recently re-christened Kopernikus, resulted in
a decision-support system optimising the integrated use of terrestrial
and airborne data collection, existent satellite earth observation sys-
tems, such as those of ESA and the European Meteorological Satellite
Organisation ("EUMETSAT"), and where appropriate, new instru-
ments and satellite systems to fill in any gaps detected. 16 5 The GMES
project is focused on practical downstream applications primarily of a
public interest-nature, but GMES has inherent possibilities for more
commercially-oriented applications.
ESA and the European Union will jointly finance and run,
through a daughter entity, this complex project. 16 6 Beyond that,
while the contours of GMES may be gradually emerging, many key
aspects of the institutional and operational structure of GMES are not
yet defined.
The Council Resolution of November 2001 called for the European
Commission to coordinate with ESA to achieve "an operational and
autonomous European capability for global monitoring for environ-
ment and security" by 2008, crucially involving a satellite system.
167
Such a capability will, in substance, take the form of databases to be
163. The first was Galileo. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. M.C. MUNoz
RODRIGUEZ & J.M. DE FARAMIRAN GILBERT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 199-201 (2007).
164. Council Resolution on The Launch of The Initial Period of Global Monitoring
For Environment and Security (GMES), O.J. Etm. CMTY. 371 (2001); Authorisation for
State Aid Pursuant to Article 87 and 88 of The E.C. Treaty Cases Where the Commis-
sion Raises No Objections, O.J. EuR. CMTY. 350/04 (2001).
165. IRNGAR MARBOE, NATIONALES WELTRAUMRECT - NATIONAL SPACE LAw 39-40
(2008); MARCO FERRAZZANI, PROJECT 2001 - LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMMERCIAL
USE OF OUTER SPACE 196-97 (2002).
166. Galileo Joint Undertaking, May 24, 2002, E.C. Reg. No. 876/2002, O.J. 138/1;
European GNSS Supervisory Authority, July 12, 2004, No. 1321/2004/EC, O.J. 246/1.
Any governance structure for GMES/Kopernikus is yet to be decided.
167. See Council Resolution on the Launch of the Initial Period of Global Monitoring
for Environmental and Security (GMES), supra note 164, T1 3.
[Vol. 42
EUROPEAN SATELLITE OBSERVATION
filled with relevant data (partly self-generated by the key GMES play-
ers, partly generated by other satellite operators, and distributed,
under contracts, to those key GMES players). Whenever and to
whomever GMES's purposes and aims require, this data should be
made available.
In this context, the Council Resolution of November 2001 pro-
vided the underlying general policy as the point of departure for all
further action. A Communication of February 2004168 built further on
this underlying general policy by extolling a grand scheme for GMES's
implementation. A third policy document, a Communication of No-
vember 2005 aptly entitled From Concept to Reality, 1 69 saw the first
practical-level implementation, although still remaining at a policy
level. While the GMES website refers to an actual Decision of the Eu-
ropean Commission, a real piece of European Commission legislation,
dated 8 March 2006 pertaining to the establishment of a core team on
GMES labelled the GMES Bureau; that Decision has not been possible
to locate and access.1 70
The Communication of 10 November 2005 first recites the general
thrust and approach to the GMES project. The Communication of 10
November 2005 states, "the need for reliable and timely information
has been underlined by increased demand. Natural and manmade ca-
tastrophes in Europe, America, Asia and Africa, coupled with in-
creased security needs, have further reinforced the case for improved
monitoring systems. Global to local levels of requirements have now
been identified. 1 7 1 This includes the need to ensure users "that the
services will be available on a long-term basis. This requires action to
guarantee the availability of the space-based, in-situ and data man-
agement infrastructures. ' u"72
GMES is tasked to support a range of European Union policies
and the 10 November 2005 Communication refers to specific, concrete
examples like the European Union's involvement in agriculture, envi-
ronmental and fisheries monitoring, external relations such as disas-
ter and emergency response action, and development policies. 173 The
168. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council - Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): Establishing a
GMES Capacity by 2008, Feb. 3, 2004, COM(2004).
169. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment - Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): From Concept to Re-
ality, Nov. 10, 2005, COM(2005) 565 [hereinafter COM(2005)].
170. GMES Advisory Council and GMES Bureau, http://www.gmes.info/72.0.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2009) (containing all applicable E.C. legislation as well as many
related and/or preparatory documents, but does not offer a relevant result on using ap-
plicable search terms).
171. See COM(2005), supra note 169, at 5.
172. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 6-7.
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10 November 2005 Communication further paves the way forward by
defining the concepts of pilot operational services and Fast Track
introduction.
XI. THE INSPIRE DIRECTIVE AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR
GMES/KOPERNIKUS
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security ("GMES")/
Kopernikus is not mature enough to move from the policy area to the
legal area. That is not to say that there is no European Community
law relevant for, and actually even explicitly taking into account, this
second European space project. However, the law concerned a Direc-
tive dealing with just one aspect of the broader picture. In early 2007,
the European Community enunciated the INSPIRE Directive 174 to
help establish an infrastructure for all spatial information within the
European Union. 17 5 Spatial information essentially means geograph-
ical information integrated from a variety of disciplines for a number
of uses, most notably uses relating to environmental protection and
the formulation and implementation of European Union policies in
that area.
While this initiative did not specifically take into account GMES,
the possibility of application of the legal parameters and consequences
the initiative established remains in existence. There is no automatic
carve-out for GMES-related data operations and activities from such
application. As a matter of fact, the Directive itself posits that it will
add value to European Union initiatives such as GMES, as "Member
States should consider using the data and services resulting from
GMES as these services become available ....
In the context of the INSPIRE Directive, no specific reference can
be found to space-borne data or satellites as part of the Infrastructure
for Spatial Information. The lack of a specific reference to space-borne
data and satellites is largely due to the fact that space-borne data and
satellites are still considered of a special nature and therefore, to a
quite fundamental extent, outside of the scope of European Commu-
nity law and relevant European Union competences.
174. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing an Infra-
structure for Spatial Information in the European Community (INSPIRE), 2007, 2007/
2/EC, O.J. 108/1 [hereinafter INSPIRE Directive].
175. Lesley J. Smith & Catherine Doldirina, Remote Sensing Data: Some Critical
Comments on the Current State of Regulation and Reflections on Reform, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE FORTY-NI.4TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 259 (2007); The EU
INSPIRE Directive: a Suitable Mechanism to Make Spatial Data (More) Available?, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 109-18 (2008).
176. INSPIRE Directive, supra note 174, § 10.
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Nevertheless, such space-borne data needs to make use of such an
infrastructure - websites, web-based, or other computerised databases
or archives, as well as interpretation processes, mechanisms, and in-
stitutions - to become distributed and accessible. As soon as that
would happen, the INSPIRE Directive would likely have an impact
here as well. Under the INSPIRE Directive, "'infrastructure for spa-
tial information' means metadata, spatial data sets and spatial data
services; network services and technologies; agreements on sharing,
access and use; and coordination and monitoring mechanisms,
processes and procedures." 177 The INSPIRE Directive defines "'spa-
tial data' as any data with a direct or indirect reference to a specific
location or geographical area."178 A whole range of GMES data and
services would fall within such definitions - basically all data related
to the environment or security issues which specifically refer to, and
identify, a specific area.
The INSPIRE Directive focuses on environmental policy but may
extend to other sectors such as agriculture, transport, and energy.
The INSPIRE Directive is designed to optimise the ability to utilize
data that are already available by requiring the documentation of ex-
isting spatial data, the implementation of services rendering the spa-
tial data more accessible and interoperable, and by dealing with
obstacles to the use of the spatial data. The INSPIRE Directive's ma-
jor drive is to maximise access to relevant data by all concerned indi-
viduals. The legal rules and obligations developed on the basis of the
INSPIRE Directive are principally drafted to underpin that drive.
The European Community had already designed several law in-
struments to promote the availability of public sector information,
such as the Directive on public access to environmental information 179
and the Directive on the re-use of public sector information.1 8 0 Never-
theless, European Union member states would find it difficult to make
their existing systems interoperable, accessible, and useable across
borders without the INSPIRE Directive as there would not be an Eu-
ropean-level drive to push for the inevitable changes at the national
level. The lack of interoperable systems between member states
would lead to more duplication and inefficient data collection. The IN-
SIPRE Directive attempts to facilitate formulation, implementation,
177. Id. art. 3(1).
178. Id. art. 3(2).
179. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Public Access to
Environmental Information and Repealing Council Directive, 2003, 90/313/EEC, 2003/
4/EC, O.J. 41/26.
180. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Re-Use of Pub-
lic Sector Information, 2003, 2003/98/EC, O.J. 345/90.
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monitoring, and evaluation of national and European Union
policies.' 8 '
The INSPIRE Directive lays down general rules for the establish-
ment of an infrastructure for spatial information in the European
Union. The component elements of those infrastructures shall include
the following:
(1) metadata (information describing spatial data sets and
spatial data services and making it possible to discover, in-
ventory and use them); 8 2
(2) spatial data sets (any data with a direct or indirect refer-
ence to a specific location or geographical area) as long as in
an electronic format; 183
(3) spatial data services;18 4
(4) network services and technologies;18 5
(5) agreements on sharing;' 8 6
(6) access and use coordination; 18 7 and
(7) monitoring mechanisms, processes, and procedures.188
These elements have a direct impact on GMES. For example, Eu-
ropean Union member states "shall provide the institutions and bod-
ies of the European Community with access to spatial data sets and
services in accordance with harmonised conditions."1 8 9 If the GMES
Authority becomes an institution or body of the European Community,
GMES could benefit from data collected by national authorities of the
European Union member states.
The INSPIRE Directive provides further requirements, resting
upon European Union member states. First, metadata shall be cre-
ated and kept up to date for spatial data sets and services falling
under the scope of the INSPIRE Directive in a manner harmonised in
accordance with the Directive itself as well as with further rules of
implementation that were to be adopted by May 15, 2008.190
Second, as to the spatial data sets and services, Articles 7 and 8 of
the INSPIRE Directive create a detailed implementation procedure
and process to address interoperability between member states. 19 1
181. INSPIRE Directive, supra note 174, art. 1(1). Article 1(2) further provides that
INSPIRE "shall build upon infrastructures for spatial information established and oper-
ated by the Member States." Id. art. 1(2).
182. Id. arts. 3(6), 5, 6.
183. Id. arts. 3(3), 4(1.b), (2), 7-10.
184. Id. arts. 3(4), 4(3), 7-10.
185. Id. arts. 11-16.
186. Id. art. 17.
187. Id.
188. Id. arts. 18, 19.
189. Id. art. 17(8).
190. Id. arts, 5,6.
191. Id. art. 9(a).
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The INSPIRE Directive already provides detailed categorisation of
spatial data themes by means of three Annexes listing respectively
such spatial data themes.1 92
Third, the requirements underlying access to, and distribution of,
data sets and services are imposed on the network services. European
Union member states shall establish and operate upload services to
make metadata and spatial data sets and services accessible, includ-
ing the following:
(1) search and discovery services;' 9 3
(2) view services "to display, navigate, zoom in/out, pan, or
overlay viewable spatial data sets, and to display legend in-
formation and any relevant content of metadata;" 9 4
(3) download services enabling copies of spatial data sets, or
of parts of such sets, to be downloaded;' 9 5
(4) transformation services, enabling spatial data sets to be
transformed;1 96 and
(5) meta services, that is services enabling the data services
properly speaking to be invoked.' 9 7
Fourth, European Union member states shall make certain that
at least the services referred to under numbers 1 and 2 above are
available free of charge.' 98 "Where public authorities levy charges for
the services, referred to [in 3, 4, and 5,] member states shall ensure
that e-commerce services are available."' 9 9
There are exceptions to the obligations of European Union mem-
ber states to make data available. The exceptions relate to data that
would adversely affect member states' "international relations, public
security or national defence," "confidentiality of the proceedings of
public authorities [as long as that] confidentiality is provided for by
law," the course of justice, the confidentiality of commercial, indus-
trial, or personal privacy-sensitive information (including intellectual
property rights), or the protection of the environment. 20 0
In sum, while this piece of European Community law will greatly
impact (amongst others) GMES/Kopernikus, it does so only in a spe-
cific downstream area of GMES. Namely, the INSPIRE Directive will
impact GMES's data distribution on a technical/operational level be-
cause it focuses on levelling the playing field within the European
192. Id. art. 4(1.d).
193. Id. art. 11(1.a), 11(2).
194. Id. art. 11(1.b).
195. Id. art. 11(1.c).
196. Id. art. 11(1.d).
197. Id. art. li(1.e).
198. Id. art. 14(1).
199. Id. art. 14(4).
200. Id. arts. 13(1), 17(7).
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Union's Internal Market. It shows, firstly, the limits to the likelihood
of European Community law underpinning broader policy initiatives
such as GMES/Kopernikus, meaning that it by default leaves the re-
mainder of legal instruments to be developed at the national level. It
shows, secondly, the possibility that European Community law may
have to lay down a regulatory framework harmonising member state
laws on a key aspect of earth observation data distribution. Thereby,
it may limit national sovereign discretion of the member states to that
extent.
XII. CONCLUSION
The most fundamental conclusion derived from the foregoing of
key aspects of the European spacescape for satellite earth observation
activities and data distribution is that the laws, regulations, and poli-
cies shaping that particular spacescape arise at various levels, na-
tional, European, or global - and in some cases at a combination of
those.
The best approach to understand this complicated process is still
to use the individual European states as starting points for analysis.
The national level is the first to develop policies dealing with earth
observation and the resulting data; only then the European levels may
come into play. Often, the European states understand that sharing
funds, know-how, and resources may greatly enhance the chances of a
certain policy or policy initiative's success, including actual earth ob-
servation projects and programmes. A European state's national in-
volvement depends upon many factors such as choosing the European
Union, the European Space Agency ("ESA"), the European Meteoro-
logical Satellite Organisation ("EUMETSAT"), or even (as with SPOT)
a more classical intergovernmental arrangement as the favoured in-
strument or platform.
But the story does not end there. The historically-grown exper-
tise and experience with European platforms and statutorily-deter-
mined competences of the organisations involved, namely ESA and
increasingly also EUMETSAT, means that these organizations can
take the initiative or play a major role in shaping others' initiatives to
create feasible policies and programmes. While the European Union
may come from a different angle, the European Commission's compe-
tences to initiate and drive policies and programmes (such as GMES/
Kopernikus) are even more integrally shaping the European
spacescape.
The above leads the analysis back to the concrete elaboration and
implementation of policies concerning laws and regulations. The legal
tools used by ESA and EUMETSAT to implement certain policies are
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restricted to a number of internal competences and the possibility to
impact downstream data access by contracts and licenses (such as in
the area of copyright protection). By contrast, the European Union
avails itself of a wide array of legislative measures - notably Regula-
tions, Directives, and Decisions - to follow up on policy initiatives,
whether they concern Green or White Papers on general space policy
issues or joint space projects such as GMES/Kopernikus and Galileo.
While the individual member states, through the indispensable role of
the Council, ultimately control legislative development, the European
Union has established some legal regimes of European-wide applica-
bility such as the Directive on database protection and the INSPIRE
Directive.
At the same time, European Community law still focuses on gen-
eral issues of market liberalisation and harmonisation of national
laws to that end. Therefore, the role of the individual European states
is still of major importance. The German Act on Satellite Data Secur-
ity is a case in point. In an area where European competence has not
moved beyond some general initial efforts which are focused on trans-
parency rather than real substance as exemplified by Regulation
1334/2000 and the regime built on it, the German Act on Satellite
Data Security ("GASDS") focuses on real substance. Even where Eu-
ropean Community law rules supreme, practically, it is often neces-
sary for national jurisdictions to implement and enforce those rules.
This causes national jurisdictions to exert a major influence on the
actual playing field.
Finally, for the non-initiated in European history, all this may
present an unnecessarily complicated legal and policy spacescape. I
am reminded of General Charles de Gaulle, erstwhile French Second
World War-hero and later President, who was grilled by a journalist
for refusing to even contemplate reunifying East and West Germany
back in the 1960s. When the reporter mused that De Gaulle's hate of
Germany must remain really intense as illustrated by that refusal, De
Gaulle famously is said to have answered: "No, on the contrary, I love
Germany so much that I rather see two of them." Maybe DeGaulle's
quote, somehow, applies to the European spacescape and satellite
earth observation. If so, the fact that Germany was ultimately re-
united offers some hope that the various Europes might eventually be
able to sort things out properly.
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